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Miroljub Labus, Ph.D. 
 
The Platform for Reaching National Consensus 
 
 
The G 17 PLUS Platform for Reaching National Consensus comprises ten issues 
of key importance for the reorganization of the state and successful continuation 
of economic reforms. The Platform contains the description of the present 
situation with respect to each issue and defines goals and proposes of measures 
for reaching these goals. The Document has been distributed to all member 
parties of the original DOS coalition, to trade unions and the Serbian diaspora, 
together with the G 17 PLUS initiative for a series of discussions on all relevant 
issues.  
The Platform was inspired by the necessity of clearly defining the national 
interests of Serbia through reaching the widest possible consensus which would 
replace the growing conflicts on the Serbian political scene. In that respect, the 
most realistic form of implementation is a series of discussions with various 
participants on all or some of the open issues. 
The fundamental national interest of Serbia is to become part of European 
integrations. However, a clearly formulated state strategy is a conditio sine qua 
non for getting closer to the family of European states. It should primarily involve 
two key processes - the continuation of economic reforms and the adoption of 
the Constitution which guarantees individual freedoms and uncontestable 
individual rights. 
In the process of the continuation of reforms, it is necessary to pay attention to 
their social sustainability. Balance in this area can be achieved through social 
agreement between unions and relevant political factors. As far as the new 
Constitution is concerned, one issue may appear hard to resolve, i.e. territorial 
organization of power and the consequent constitutional status of Kosovo and 
Metohija.  
The most efficient way for overcoming the deepening political and institutional 
crisis in Serbia at present is to recognize key state issues, as well as to formulate 
clear strategies for resolving them without political conflicts which threaten to 
further disrupt the state. The G 17 PLUS Platform is an initiative for discussions 
and a broad basis for reaching national consensus, with primary emphasis on the 
interests of the state and citizens and on necessary political stability. 
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National Consensus 
On the 10 most important issues 
 
Issues Present situation Goals Measures  
1. Continuation of 
economic reforms 
•The country is halfway     
in the transition to a market 
economy (which 
corresponds to the process 
of EU accession) 
•Social costs and 
unemployment 
(underemployment) are 
major concerns 
•Public support for reforms 
is much lower than in 2001 
•The second phase of the 
transition 
•Medium-term program of 
structural reforms 
•Social dialogue and social 
security  
• A three-year social 
agreement between the 
government and trade 
unions 
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Issues Present situation Goals Measures  
2. National issue •Serbs are living in 
different states, while 
homelands of national 
minorities are in the 
neighborhood 
•Strained relations between 
the Serbian Diaspora and 
Serbia proper 
• Integration of minorities 
(without assimilation) is 
still under the threat of 
secession 
•Everybody is worried 
about losing identity in the 
process of Europeanization 
•All Serbs and national 
minorities live in one 
community without 
borders 
 
 
•Unification of Serbs and 
national minorities with 
their homelands within the 
EU integration process  
•Action plan for 
cooperation between Serbia 
proper and the Diaspora 
•Constitutional guarantees 
of minority rights and 
freedoms  
•A new territorial 
organization of the state 
(asymmetrical autonomy of 
two provinces and creation 
of regions governing police, 
education, culture, etc.)  
3. Country's 
international position 
•The October 2000 
reputation has not been 
preserved 
•UNSC's allegations of 
failure to fulfill the 
obligations relative to the 
cooperation with the ICTY 
•To re-establish the 
country's reputation 
abroad 
•Strict implementation of 
the Law on cooperation 
with the ICTY 
• Empower domestic 
judiciary to process 
potential new war crime 
charges  
• Partnership For Peace 
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Issues Present situation Goals Measures  
4. Relations with 
Montenegro 
•A confederation in 
practice is an impediment 
to EU integration and 
international representation 
 
•The state must be 
functional 
•Set the deadline for 
harmonization  
•If harmonization falls 
short, protect the national 
interests of Serbia (a new 
constitution should ensure 
its independence and 
separate accession 
processes to EU and WTO) 
5. Kosovo and  
Metohija 
•Inefficient protection of 
Serbian population, the 
UNSC 1244 Resolution has 
hitherto not been in effect 
•The current process is 
leading to independence of 
Kosovo and Metohija  
•Protection of Serbian 
population 
•A dialogue between 
Belgrade and Prishtina 
•Autonomy for the northern 
part of Kosovo  
•Special protection for 
Serbian monasteries  
•Collective return of 
refugees and IDPs to the 
northern part of Kosovo and 
Metohija  
6. Accession to EU • A Feasibility study is 
delayed  
•The SA process has come 
to a standstill 
 
Accession road map: 
•Feasibility study in II 
quarter of 2003 
•SA agreement in IV 
quarter of 2003 
•Status of a candidate 
•Action plan for 
harmonization 
•Should the Action Plan be 
late or not in effect, initiate 
a separate process for 
entrance to the EU  
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Issues Present situation Goals Measures  
country in 2007 
•Full membership in 
2010 
•Adopt a new pro-European 
Serbian constitution  
 
7. Constitution •The existing constitution 
is an obstacle to a clean cut 
with the past 
•A new Constitution 
should be adjusted to the 
Constitutional Charter.   
•Constitution in 
compliance with EU 
standards  
•Constitutional 
Commission consisting of 
respectable experts  
•Adoption of the 
constitution by July 2003  
•Simultaneous elections for 
parliament and a 
referendum for the 
Constitution in the fall 2003 
8. Balance of power •Balance of power between 
the two pillars of executive 
power (the government and 
the president) has been 
disturbed  
 
•The nonexistence of a 
president is an indicator of the 
political crisis 
• International reputation of 
the country has deteriorated
•  Balance of power 
between executive and 
judicial branches 
 
• Balance within the 
executive power 
 
•New constitution 
•Revoke the obligatory 
50% turnout for presidential 
election 
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Issues Present situation Goals Measures  
9. Democracy •Weak parliamentary 
control over government  
• Manipulation of 
mandates against the 
voters' will  
•No stable parliamentary 
majority needed to bring 
systematic laws  
•Responsible 
government with the 
parliament representing 
the will of voters  
 
•New constitution 
•New electoral law 
10. Rule of law •State apparatus is 
bureaucratized, expensive 
and inefficient  
•Inherited corruption is 
still present 
•Property rights and 
freedom to make contracts 
are violated  
•The rule of law should 
be efficient and limited 
by rights and freedoms 
of citizens  
•Private property must 
be sacred  
•Radical reform and 
capacity building of the 
state administration 
•Special judicial and 
investigating offices for the 
struggle against corruption 
•Lustration 
•Denationalization 
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G 17 Institute Team 
 
Institutional Review 
 
Central Bank Independence  
 
Central banks can be divided into independent and dependent ones. The wider 
the freedom in pursuing credit, monetary and foreign exchange policy and 
supervision of banks, the more independent the central bank. Dependent central 
banks make decisions under the pressure of the state, i.e. the government, thus 
becoming an instrument in pursuing government’s policy. However, where 
pursuance of economic policy is concerned, independent central banks also 
coordinate their activities with other relevant state economic policy-makers 
(primarily with the ministries of finance and economics). The independence of a 
central bank in itself is not sufficient for attaining macroeconomic goals. The 
central bank needs to cooperate with particular line ministries and the 
government and vice versa, but for the pursuance of its policy, the central bank is 
accountable to parliament. At the international level, the central bank cooperates 
with international financial institutions and central banks of other countries. This 
means that the autonomy of the central bank does not mean absolute freedom, 
but a coordinated relationship with all relevant subjects in the country and 
abroad, and accountability for decisions taken. This ensures respect for the 
principle of limiting of power and assumption of all key instruments for providing 
macroeconomic stability. All of these have positive impact on pursuing sound 
economic policy and prevent politically motivated monetary expansion. 
Central bank independence is assessed on the basis of analysis of legislation 
which regulates issues relevant for its autonomous work. Analysis of legislation 
assesses whether the central bank is a leading institution in the monetary area; 
whether it has constitutional, i.e. legal obligation to follow established economic 
policy objectives; whether it is obliged to support the government’s policy; 
whether it is subordinate with respect to general guidelines set by the 
government; whether it is allowed to oppose to the government’s general 
guidelines; whether it is accountable directly to parliament; whether it is entirely 
under state ownership, etc. 
Why an independent central bank at all? Autonomy of the central bank is directly 
related to efficient attainment of economic policy objectives. Firstly, independent 
central banks have more success in combating inflation. Typical examples of 
independent central banks are the German and Swiss central banks, which were 
holding inflation steady at about 3% on the average at an annual level for a long 
period of time (about 40 years) and were world leaders with regard to the stability 
of national currencies. One percentage point higher inflation was present in 
Japan and the USA, whose central banks have a slightly lower degree of 
autonomy. A list can be made with Sweden, Denmark, France, Finland, the UK, 
Spain, Italy…where states are listed following the degree of independence of 
their central banks (from independent to less autonomous) and increasing 
inflation rates. Secondly, autonomy of the central bank is inversely proportional 
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to the unemployment rate. Typical examples are Switzerland and Spain. 
Switzerland, a state with a very high degree of central bank autonomy registers 
very low unemployment rates, while Spain, with lower degree of autonomy of its 
central bank records higher unemployment rates. These examples are based on 
figures for the period from the late 1950s through the early 1990s. However, 
since for a long time it made no sense to compare Serbia with developed 
countries, and as the most successful transition countries made huge steps 
towards the European Union during the last decade, independence of the central 
bank in Serbia will primarily be compared with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
 
Arguments for Central Bank Independence in Serbia 
 
An independent central bank provides a stable national currency. In the last two 
years, despite structural changes in the financial system and liberalization of 
prices, the stability of the dinar has been successfully maintained. Accordingly, 
restriction of autonomy of the Serbian central bank could be motivated by short-
term goals of some interest groups, but in the long run, it would only result in 
draining off of real money toward economic subjects incapable of surviving in 
market conditions. 
Central bank independence enables economic growth and development. A ten-
year experience (1990-2000) showed that inflation creates an unfavorable 
investment climate; instability of the national currency prevents long-term 
planning and directs available money (foreign exchange) towards speculative 
activities. In 2002, macroeconomic stabilization was established and conditions 
for realization of credit lines were created, while domestic savings are growing. 
The violation of central bank autonomy in monetary, credit and foreign exchange 
activities would result, on the one hand, in the suspension of investment plans of 
small and medium-size enterprises, and on the other, in speculative gains of all 
who count on inflationary gains and gains from currency differentials (well known 
pattern “buy for 6, sell for 30”)  
Central bank independence prevents inflationary taxes and financing of quasi-
fiscal activities. The reform of the financial system implemented thus far could be 
replaced with a retrograde method of taxation through inflation, which is a 
manner used by fiscally incapable states. Moreover, such a taxation model would 
bring about changes in the dynamics of public revenues, which would be soon 
followed by a drop in their absolute amounts; public revenues would not be 
sufficient for implementation of a rational social program and would halt the 
repayment of state debts owed to citizens (debt on the basis of old foreign 
currency savings, debt toward pensioners, etc.) and to foreign creditors.  
An independent central bank ensures efficient application of available monetary 
instruments. The discount rate, which was cut down to 9% at the beginning of 
January 2003, is becoming increasingly important as an instrument of monetary, 
credit and economic policy. Tight credit control of commercial banks has yielded 
best results thus far in eliminating high inflation rates which were generated 
through the primary issue. Open market operations are becoming increasingly 
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important instruments, especially given the establishment of a treasury with the 
Ministry of Finance and the possibility of state borrowing outside the central 
bank. The regulation of reserve requirements is an instrument which ensures 
confidence in the banking system by preventing possible shocks on the financial 
market (primarily by protecting citizens’ new foreign currency deposits). 
An independent central bank makes possible the policy of a fluctuating foreign 
exchange rate, which prevents intentional fluctuations motivated by financial 
gains that can be realized through currency differentials and through the export 
of economically uncompetitive products which seek their opportunity in the 
change of monetary factors and not in the improvement of their own productivity. 
Numerous econometric models show that, in the case of Serbia, the foreign 
exchange rate has no effect on export growth, but what has significant impact is 
productivity improvement.1 
 
 
Concepts of Central Bank Independence 
 
In this paper, we used four concepts for assessing independence of the central 
bank: 
• Institutional concept – Independence refers to the central bank’s power 
to formulate a monetary policy independently from political institutions, in 
particular from executive power (the government); 
• Functional independence stands for free decisions related to monetary 
policy instruments, and is achieved when the central bank has full 
discretion to deploy monetary policy in attaining goals; 
• Organizational independence concerns freedom of appointment and 
dismissal of central bank officials. The longer the term of office of the 
appointees, the more autonomous the central bank. 
• Financial independence relates to the role which the government and/or 
Parliament plays in determining the budget of the central bank. 
Several authors noted that the new central bank laws in transition countries had 
their role model in the Bundesbank, believing that they could inherit  the good 
inflation record of Germany. However, except for the successful fight against 
inflation, the central bank is not the only one in charge of formulating sound 
economic policy, with this rather being a coordinated action of all economic 
institutions in one country; consequently, the question arises whether it is 
possible to import German cultural aversion to inflation as well. If it is not possible 
simply to transfer (as no cultural pattern can be transferred), the question is what 
to do to build up, both in public and political spheres, cultural aversion to inflation. 
Two things are certain: firstly, Serbia has horrible experience with hyperinflation 
(there is a basis for aversion to inflation), and secondly, the incitement of inflatory 
expectations and departure from the policy of stable national currency will not 
result in the creation of this cultural pattern, but in the establishment of a position 
that inflation is inevitable and that we should just get used to it. 
                                                 
1 See: e.g. article “Macroeconomic Trends in 2002 and Forecasts For The First Six Months Of 2003” in this 
issue of the G17 Institute Economic Review. 
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Measuring Independence of the National Bank of Serbia 
 
In this section we will present the GMT method (Grilli, Masciandro and Tabellini) 
for measuring independence of a central bank. This method tends to incorporate 
all four previously described concepts of independence (institutional, functional, 
organizational and financial) with the word of law. 
The GMT index divides central bank independence into two components – 
political and economic. Political independence (PI) is defined as the capacity of 
the monetary authority to independently choose the final goal of monetary and 
credit policy within the overall economic policy, and it is subject to three factors: 
the relationship between the government and the central bank in the formulation 
of monetary policy, the procedure of appointing the board of directors / governor, 
and the publicly set formal goal (e.g. inflation rate, stability of national currency). 
These three factors are operationalized by eight criteria: appointment procedure 
for high officials of the bank (the governor and the board), length of their term of 
office, participation of the government representative in the board, government 
approval of monetary policy, legal provision of strengthening the bank’s position 
against the government in case of conflict and statutory obligations to maintain 
price stability. The GMT index of political independence is a sum of all these 
equally weighted factors. 
The GMT index of economic independence (EI) is defined as the capacity of the 
central bank to choose the instruments of monetary policy, and covers legal 
constraints on the central bank’s lending to the government, and the position of 
the central bank in supervising banks. An independent central bank has limited 
direct credit facility and borrows at market interest rates.  
In calculating political and economic independence of central banks in transition 
countries it is more precise to use a modified GMT index (Maliszevski – 1997). 
Modification refers to criteria for evaluation of the governor’s appointment 
procedure (G1 – two extra points if the governor is appointed neither by 
government nor by parliament). Other differences refer to the provisions for 
dismissal of high officials of the bank (non-political reasons only – inability to 
perform duties or participation in criminal activities). 
 
Table 1: Modified GMT Index of Political Independence  
 
 
 G1 G2 B3 B4 B5 R6 R7 C8 C9 Total 
Serbia •  •  • • • •  6 
 
 
Rules for giving points 
G1 - Governor not appointed by the government  • ; not appointed by the 
government and parliament  •• 
G2 - Governor appointed for more than 5 years 
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B3 - None of the Board (vice governor, deputy governors) appointed by the 
government 
B4 - Board appointed for more than 5 years 
B5 - Provisions for Governors dismissal non-political only 
R6 - No mandatory government representative in the board 
R7 - Government/parliament approval of monetary policy is not required 
C8 - Statutory responsibility to pursue monetary stability 
C9 - Presence of legal provision supporting the Bank in conflicts with the 
government 
 
 
Table 2: Modified GMT Index of Economic Independence 
+ 
 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 M6 M7 Total 
Serbia •  • •  •  4 
 
 
D1 - Direct credit facility is not automatic 
D2 - Direct credit facility is at market interest rates (or at least at discount rates) 
D3 - Direct credit facility is temporary 
D4 - Direct credit facility is of a limited amount 
D5 - Bank does not participate in the primary market for public debt 
M6 - The discount rate is set by the central bank 
M7 - Supervision of commercial banks is not entrusted to the central bank 
 
GRAFIKON 
Corrected GMT Index of Political and Economic Independence of Central 
Banks 
 
In 2000, the Serbian Central Bank had the lowest level of political independence 
of all transition countries, while, with regard to economic independence, it was 
the second from the bottom among 15 countries under consideration. Today the 
Serbian Central Bank, compared to other transition countries (1996-end) ranks 
seventh in terms of both political and economic independence. At the end of 
1996, Croatian, Slovenian, Lithuanian, Polish, Georgian and Czech central banks 
had a higher level of political independence than the Serbian Central Bank has 
today. In the same period, Slovenian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Kyrgyz and 
Georgian central banks had a higher level of economic independence than the 
Central Bank of Serbia has today. The previously described situation confirms 
the opinion that an independent central bank (above all, a politically independent 
central bank) has more success in maintaining stability of the national currency. 
In the period before 2000, the central bank was not in a position to pursue the 
policy of a stable dinar because of high political dependence. In the last two 
years, one of the key reasons for relatively low inflation is political independence 
of the central bank. 
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The observation that the work of the National Bank of Serbia (until recently 
National Bank of Yugoslavia) has been regulated by the same law until 2000 as 
today is very interesting. A higher level of independence of the National Bank of 
Serbia in the two previous years compared with the former period indicates that 
the personality of the governor and other officials in the National Bank may have 
significant impact on the level of political and economic independence of the 
central bank within the same legal framework. 
A higher level of political independence of the central bank could be reached 
through the following changes: 
• Firstly, it is necessary to establish the institution of the board of directors 
(the proposal rejected in the Federal Parliament in the late 2002 with the 
argumentation that the central bank would become more independent that 
way!!!) 
• Secondly, the governor’s term of office should be extended to last over 
five years. The governor’s term of office in the Central Bank of Switzerland 
is 6 years, in Netherlands, Austria and Canada, 7 years, in Germany, 8 
years, and unlimited in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Italy. In the USA, 
members of the board of directors are appointed for 14 years (without the 
possibility of reelection), which means that the president of the USA is 
elected three times during one term of office of the Central Bank director. 
• Thirdly, in case of conflict between the central bank and the government 
(whereas the nature of the relationship between the central bank and the 
government may be in conflict because short-term and politically suitable 
solutions from the viewpoint of the government may mean disruption of 
stability of the national currency or the exchange rate), special legal 
protection of the central bank is necessary (so that it is able to carry out its 
activities independently and without disturbance) from the government’s 
pressure. Also, it should be mentioned that the criterion B5 (provisions for 
Governor’s dismissal, non-political only) is entirely fulfilled in view of 
positive legislation.  
The Central Bank of Serbia possesses the necessary level of economic 
independence. It is not obliged to credit either the state or commercial banks 
automatically, but in order to pursue more efficient economic policy, it is 
allowed to finance the overcoming of budgetary imbalances only for a limited 
period of time (by the end of a fiscal year) and for a limited amount (up to 
10% of the projected annual revenues to the state’s budget, providing that the 
total amount must be up to 15% of the increase in the Central Bank’s dinar 
placement). Also, the Central Bank establishes the level of the discount rate. 
However, for further strengthening of the economic independence of the 
National Bank of Serbia it is necessary to provide: 
• Firstly, direct credit facility (Article 34 the NBY Law, exception from 
Article 32) addressed to the state/republic should not be lower than the 
discount rate (or even the market interest rate). 
• Secondly, the Bank should not participate in the primary market for 
public debt. This item is the hardest to be achieved, given the Central 
Bank’s commitment to repay public debt on the basis of old foreign 
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currency savings by 2016, and we may expect the purchase of 
securities issued by the Treasury in the future. 
Moreover, besides the board of directors as an institution which guarantees 
central bank independence, what should also be introduced is the establishment 
of targeted inflation for the current year and an obligation of maintaining it at the 
planned level (determined by the central bank). The question of targeted inflation 
is closely connected with the creditability of the central bank, where credibility is 
defined as confidence in the bank to carry out what has been announced. 
However, in attaining this goal the governor also needs support from economic 
policy makers and takers, i.e. from the government. The third key element that 
must be defined refers to reasons for the governor’s dismissal, which are 
contained under previously established obligations. 
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Macroeconomic Topic 
 
Kristian Vukojicic 
 
 
GRAY ECONOMY IN SERBIA 
With Special Emphasis On Banks 
 
At the end of 2002, the G 17 Institute conducted a preliminary survey of the gray 
economy in Serbia. The aim was not to make a precise and quantitative 
estimation of the gray economy, but only to start identifying it and to propose 
concrete actions so as to transform the gray economy into legal economic flows, 
thus contributing to the fight against the gray economy, which policy-makers in 
Serbia set as a target for 2003/4. 
Since the gray economy and the baking industry are closely connected and 
because a well-regulated financial system disables most common forms of the 
gray economy, we made a special overview of the banking system. 
The analysis of the gray economy is made on the basis of information which rely 
on estimations made by the G17 Expert Network Representatives, and we may 
not make any warranty as to the accuracy of the assessment of the situation in 
municipalities, but the conclusions concerning the gray economy at a global 
level, owing to the great number of G17 Expert Network Representatives polled, 
are in our opinion close to the actual situation. The poll covered 51 municipalities 
(11 from Vojvodina and 40 from Central Serbia). 
The analysis of the banking sector is based on information obtained from the poll 
and interviews with the highest management of banks, while, in cases where we 
were not able to obtain direct information, analysis relied on estimations made by 
the most eminent experts from institutions we contacted. The analysis takes into 
consideration the following issues: banks’ capital, relationship between 
companies’ managements and banks, interest rates – break-even point, “black 
market”, financial transactions on the “black market” and taxes. 
 
Total Economic Activity 
 
The Poll encompassed seven activities: commodity production, agriculture, 
construction, transportation, trade, hotel and restaurant business and tourism, 
and crafts. We opted for this classification because it is, in our opinion, most 
acceptable to respondents and therefore yields the most precise results. As the 
statistics do not cover the gray economy, we made an estimation of the portion of 
the above-mentioned activities in the total economic activity of municipalities 
(total economic activity includes both legal and gray market activities). These 
portions served as weights for the estimation of the gray economy. 
In total economic activity, agriculture (24%), commodity production (21%) and 
trade (20%) dominate over others. 
These three activities are presented separately according to municipalities on 
Chart 1. It should be noted that in regions with developed agriculture, commodity 
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production accounts for 10%, and vice versa. Also, there is a link between trade 
and commodity production (decrease in the portion of commodity production in 
the total economic activity of the municipalities under consideration reduces the 
portion of trade). 
  
Activity Portion in the total economic activity 
Agriculture  
Commodity production   
Trade  
Construction  
Hotel and restaurant business and 
tourism 
 
Other  
Crafts  
Transportation  
 
Chart 1 - Comparative breakdown of the portion of commodity production, 
agriculture and trade in the total economic activity of the municipality under 
consideration 
- Commodity production  
- Agriculture 
- Trade 
Exceptions which depart from the average to a greater extent: 
Crafts are especially developed in Indjija, accounting for 40% (6.5 times more 
developed than the average), or as much as 70% together with trade. Similar 
exceptions are observed in Soko Banja (hotel and restaurant business and 
tourism - 66%) and Sremski Karlovci (construction - 65%). 
 
Ratio of Gray Economy to Total Economic Activity 
 
The greatest portion of the gray economy is associated with trade (36%). The 
hotel and restaurant business and tourism rank second with 33%, followed by 
crafts (31.76%). Commodity production is the second from the bottom with little 
over 20%. On one hand, this may imply stricter discipline in the production 
sector, but more significantly, this fact may indicate the underdevelopment of this 
sector, which may be the reason for the lack of greater interest in production in 
the gray area. 
However, regarding the number of municipalities in which over 10% of the total 
product is produced in the gray area of one out of seven observed activities, 
trade still ranks first with 31.37% (i.e. in almost one-third of municipalities in 
Serbia more than 10% of total activities is performed within the gray area of 
trade). Agriculture is on the second place, as agricultural gray area accounts for 
more than 10% in the total activity in every fourth municipality in Serbia. 
Transportation is on the bottom of the list with 0%, meaning that in none of the 
polled municipalities transportation activity in the gray zone produces over 10% 
of the municipality’s total product. 
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 Portion of given activity 
performed in the gray 
area  
Portion of municipalities 
in which over 10% of the 
total product is produced 
in the gray area of the 
given  activity 
Commodity production    
Agriculture   
Construction   
Transportation   
Trade   
Hotel and restaurant  
business and tourism 
  
Crafts   
Other   
 
The portion of the gray economy in the total economic activity of municipalities 
under consideration is presented in Chart 2. The data rely on task knowledge on 
the participation of the gray economy in the observed activity, and are weighted 
by the estimated portion of the same activity in the total economic activity of a 
municipality. The following five municipalities recorded the largest portions of the 
gray economy: Obrenovac, Pancevo, Krupanj, Ljubovija and Prijepolje. 
 
Chart 2 – The portion of the gray economy in the total economic activity of the 
observed municipalities 
 
Overview of the Most Common Activities in the Gray Area Within Selected 
Economic Activities 
 
Commodity production – Population’s needs stand for a significant incentive for 
the gray economy. Table 3.2 shows that more than 60% of the gray economy 
within commodity production is related to basic living necessities  (food and 
clothing). The manufacture of textile and clothes is the most common activity, 
accounting for 32% in commodity production. In second place is the manufacture 
of food products with 29% (65% of gray economy in the manufacture of food 
products refer to the manufacture of non-alcoholic beverages). The manufacture 
of wood products ranks third, the manufacture of construction material fourth and 
the manufacture of chemical products fifth. The manufacture of paper, spare 
parts for cars, cosmetics, office supplies, and tools and machinery account for 
less than 5%, and these activities are not included in the Chart for the sake of 
comprehension. 
Agriculture – As far as agriculture is concerned, there are three significant 
issues. The first one relates to bulk buyers and middlemen for agricultural 
products. This area accounts for 22% in the gray area of agriculture, and if we 
put aside the role of production of fruits, vegetables and meat as generators of 
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the gray economy, the problem of bulk buyers and middlemen would certainly be 
on the top of the list. The second issue concerns the services of land cultivation, 
which, according to the poll, accounts for as much as 15% of the total activity in 
the gray area of agriculture, which means that all services of land cultivation are 
performed in the gray area. The second from the bottom is (re)sale of fuel (wood 
and coal), with 6%. Out of the activities which are not presented due to their 
irrelevance, we must point out the 3.5% portion of the processing of agricultural 
products, which primarily illustrate underdevelopment of processing structures in 
the country, but also the opportunity to prevent the expansion of the gray 
economy in this area. We should not disregard a significant portion of the 
seasonal workforce, either, but due to the specific method for presentation of this 
issue, it was not included in Table 3.2. 
Construction – The largest portion of the gray economy in construction refers to 
the construction of buildings and facilities, and activities closely related to 
construction materials (this category comprises illicit exploitation of lime and 
sand), which is presented in Table 3.4. Individual construction (including finishing 
and adaptation) is significantly lower compared to the construction of buildings 
and facilities for business purposes. A significant portion refers to illicit 
construction, which is not comprised by the Chart because of the specific 
methodology for estimation of its impact on the gray economy. As far as actual 
activities which generate the gray economy are concerned, we should point to 
masonry, project drafting, ceramic tiles, hardwood floors, sheet metal and 
aluminum (PVC) windows, floor heating installation and maintenance. 
 
Table 3.4 - Construction 
Construction of 
buildings and facilities
 
Table 3 – Overview of the most 
common gray area activities within 
economic activities 
Timber and 
construction materials
 
Table 3.1. – Commodity production  Individual 
construction 
 
Textile and clothes  Services  
Food products  Table 3.5 - Transport 
Products of wood 
and furniture 
 Taxi  
Construction 
materials 
 Transport services  
Chemicals  Public transportation 
(passenger) 
 
Table 3.2 - Agriculture Forwarding  
Fruits and 
vegetables 
 Cable TV  
Bulk buyers and 
middlemen 
 Table 3.6 – Catering and tourism 
Meat  Café-bar  
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Land cultivation 
services 
 Restaurants  
Milk / Diary  Accommodation  
Alcohol  Tourist arrangements  
Fuel (wood and 
coal) 
 Table 3.7 – Crafts 
Table 3.3 – Trade Carpenters/jointers  
Textile  Auto mechanics  
Food  Painters/decorators  
Construction 
material 
 Hair dressers  
Cigarettes  Floor heating  
Electronics  Bakeries  
Spare parts for cars 
and furniture 
 Tailors/ dressers   
Wood - fuel  Beauticians  
 
Transportation – The most common activity in the gray area of transport 
concerns taxi services, with the portion of 35%. Transport services rank second 
(freight transport only), accounting for 30% in the total gray area of transport. 
Public (passenger) transport accounts for 26%. We should also draw attention to 
forwarding and cable TV, which, despite a rather low portion of 6%, may be 
interesting for their capacity for future generation of the gray economy. The 
portions of the gray area in transportation are presented in Table 3.5. 
Trade – In Chart 1, a relation between trade volume and commodity output 
(positive correlation, i.e. decreasing portion of commodity production in the total 
economic activity of the observed municipalities is related to the decrease in the 
portion of trade) can be observed, while in Table 3.1, which presents the most 
common activities in the gray area of commodity production, the manufacture of 
textile and clothes and food production rank first and second  (followed by 
furniture and construction materials). Table 3.3 shows a similar situation. The 
most common is textile trade (28%), followed by trade in food products (19.5%). 
Trade in construction material is in third place with 13%, and trade in cigarettes, 
electronics, spare parts for cars and furniture share the fourth place with 11%. 
Tourism and hotel and restaurant business – Over 70% of the gray area in 
tourism and the hotel and restaurant business is generated in café-bars and 
restaurants, 22% in the area of accommodation (Table 3.6). Tourism and 
catering are activities with the most developed techniques for tax evasion (e.g. 
unregistered rent of rooms, avoidance of visitors’ taxes, unregistered workers, 
unregistered turnover, unregistered hotel/restaurant establishments, unregistered 
tourist agencies, performance of activities outside registered line of business, 
organization of concerts, etc.). Café-bars, restaurants, accommodation and 
package tours are the only reported forms of gray economic activities in tourism 
and catering. 
Crafts - The most active in the gray area are carpenters/jointers (28%), auto-
mechanics and painters/decorators (18% each), while hairdressers rank fourth 
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with 12%. Floor heating installation is in fifth place, accounting for 9% in the 
generation of the gray economy, as shown in Table 3.7. 
Other – Other sources of the gray economy are agencies, real estate agencies,– 
both sale and renting, betting parlors, health services, intellectual services 
(private lessons, creation of computer programs), financial services, etc. 
 
Chart 3 – The number and percentage of the population living from the gray 
economy  
- absolute amount 
- percentage  
 
Employment and the Gray Economy 
 
 
The Poll covered 51 municipalities in 21 regions, with a population of 2.8 million. 
By summarizing the estimations of the respondents, we calculated that 670,000 
persons, i.e. 25% of the sampled population work in the gray economy. Chart 3 
shows the percentage of the population working in the gray economy and the 
number of persons (in absolute numbers) who live from the gray economy 
according to municipalities. 
 
Banking Industry 
 
Since the gray economy is closely connected to the financial system of a state, 
and as the most significant institutions on the financial market in Serbia are 
banks, this survey processed 17 banks through polls and interviews. Almost all 
biggest banks which operate on our market are included, together with a 
significant number of small and medium-sized banks (more precisely, nine big, 
three medium and five small banks). The survey analyzed bank capital, 
relationship between the management of particular companies and banks, 
interest rates, break-even points, reasons for performing some financial 
operations on the black market, taxes and the most common activities on the 
black market. 
The capital of banks was observed in view of the concentration of capital, and in 
53% of surveyed banks, one person (either natural or legal) possesses the block 
of shares of over 15%, in 6% of banks there are two persons with that proportion 
of ownership, while 41% of banks has no shareholder who, according to positive 
regulations, is obliged to declare publicly and to register with the NBY and its 
Securities Commission. 
We asked for two answers to the same question, one concerning the surveyed 
banks, and another concerning representatives’ assessment of the situation in 
other banks. Further results will be presented in that manner. 
The connection between managing structures in the real sector and banks, either 
on the basis of capital or through managing positions, has been leaving room for 
the evolution of monopolistic positions in the form of facilitated access to capital, 
but we must make distinction between two cases – when bank managers own a 
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company, and when company managers are shareholders or members of 
managing structures of the bank. 
The interconnection between the management of a company which is a depositor 
in one bank, and managing bodies of the bank would enable capital to drain off 
into private companies, especially under conditions of significant share of state 
capital in banks. Therefore, we examined the participation of managements of 
companies - depositors of certain banks in relevant bodies of that bank. 
However, we must stress that significant depositors of one bank want to have 
insight into the bank’s business performance and that is the reason for them to 
request to be present in supervisory, or even managing boards. 
 
Does the manager of a company 
which is a depositor of a given 
bank have a seat in any of the 
bank’s boards? 
Surveyed bank Opinion on other 
banks 
a.) yes, it is widespread practice   
b.) yes, in some cases   
c.) never   
d.) I do not know   
 
The first Table on the right shows the relation between real and financial sectors 
through the positions in some of the boards of one bank, while the next Table 
refers to the bank’s capital. It should be noted that nearly 75% of respondents 
gave negative answer to this question (i.e. denied that such relation exists). 
  
Is the manager of a company, 
which is a depositor (or credit 
beneficiary) of a given bank at 
the same time a shareholder of 
that bank? 
Surveyed bank Opinion on other 
banks 
a.) yes, it is widespread practice   
b.) yes, in some cases   
c.) never   
d.) I do not know   
 
Similar to the previous one is the question “Are the managers of your bank at the 
same time shareholders in companies which are depositors (or credit 
beneficiaries) of the bank?” It is interesting that in as much as over 50% of cases 
the answer is “never”, and there is a much higher percentage of ignorance with 
regard to this question than in the reverse case (previous table). 
 
Are bank managers 
shareholders in companies 
which are depositors (or credit 
beneficiaries) of that bank? 
Surveyed bank Opinion on other 
banks 
a.) yes, it is widespread practice   
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b.) yes, in some cases   
c.) never   
d.) I do not know   
 
The issue of interest rates cannot be avoided in the financial area, and the 
situation with “on-sight” deposits (tr. non-interest baring accounts) is pretty 
interesting in that respect. The bank code prescribes that banks are not obliged 
to pay out interest on on-sight deposits, but some banks nevertheless approve 
this interest in order to attract clients, arguing that in this way banks protect the 
actual value of deposited funds. On the other hand, banks which do not approve 
such interests argue that this is a policy applied by small banks which need new 
clients, or that even this concerns banks with (potential) problems with liquidity, 
and therefore they use this instrument to attract new funds, while their own 
banks, not approving interest on sight deposits, provide stronger security of the 
given deposits.  However, in the cases of a high and a stable level of on-sight 
deposits of particular clients, it is to be expected that the negotiating skills of the 
depositor should be sufficient to persuade the bank to approve an interest rate 
which, at the very least, exceeds inflation. Why does this not occur in practice? 
To the question what happens when a big depositor decides to withdraw the 
deposit from one bank and transfer it to another, one banker answered “you’ll 
offer him a car with 18-inch instead of 15-inch tires”. Because of such answers, 
the question of diversity of interest rates is included in the poll, both from the 
perspective of on-sight deposits, long-term and short-term deposits, and in terms 
of range and reason for approving diverse interest rates. 
The diversity of interest rates which banks approve to depositors exist in 94% of 
cases, while only 6% of banks do not approve different interest rates. This 
discretion is in the range of one percentage point, for two basic reasons: the 
degree of connection with a bank, and credit rating of a client (risk assessment), 
and only than the value of the deposit (other mentioned reasons are degree of 
credit guarantee and credit term). 
 
The range of interest rates on the same 
category of credits 
% of banks 
Up to 0.83% p.m.  
1% p.m.  
0.1-0.5% for foreign currency  
1.9% p.m.  
0.9-3.3% p.m.  
 
The diversity of interest rates on on-sight deposits is present in 30% of banks, 
58% of banks do not approve diverse interest rates, while 12% of banks do not 
approve interest on on-sight deposits at all. In 17% of banks this range is up to 
0.5%, 50% of banks have a range between 0.5-0.6% at a monthly level, while the 
range of 1% p.m. is present in 33% of banks. The main reported reasons are the 
amount of deposit and arrangement activities, followed by term, while the 
situation with the bank’s liquidity, the possibility and terms for financing and 
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absence of other bank products participate each with 5% in decision making 
regarding approval of diverse interest rates. We were given interesting responses 
to the question whether a similar way of doing business exist in other banks. As 
many as 41% of respondents who hold management positions in their banks are 
not familiar with interest rates on on-sight deposits offered by competitors, 47% 
of them assessed this to be widespread practice, while 12% claim this concerns 
individual cases only. Comparative examination of diversity of interest rates, 
ranges and reasons for that diversity, together with the assessment of the 
situation in other banks are shown in Table 8. 
The question which is closely related to interest rates is a bank’s break-even 
point. 46% of banks estimated interests on short-term loans in the range of 2-
2.5% at a monthly level to be their break-even point. 38% of banks defined this 
point at 1-1.5% per month, while 16% of banks did not want to respond to this 
question (or maybe did not know). As far as long-term loans are concerned, one 
third of banks estimate break-even points at 9% per year (with forex clauses). 
One fifth of banks do not approve long-term loans, and another 20% define 
break-even points at 12% (per year for long-term loans), while for 13.33% of 
banks break-even points are defined at the interest of 18%. 13.33% of banks did 
not want to respond to this question. 
Reorganization of land registers is in 7.5% cases seen as a significant factor 
which could contribute to the reduction of interest rates, while 23.5% of banks do 
not share this opinion – they do not understand interest rates to be a key 
problem, but ascribe it to the lack of credit potential of banks, hence seeing the 
growth in domestic savings as the best path towards the reduction in interest 
rates. They also think that mortgages are not a favorable solution for banks in our 
circumstances, because in that way banks (under conditions of not being able to 
collect credits) transfer their credit potential into “concrete and steel”. Over 46% 
of polled banks estimate that the interest rate will be as much as 1% per month 
after reorganization of land and cadastre registers, while 15.38% of banks 
anticipate an interest rate at a 2-3% at monthly level. It is interesting that none of 
the banks opted for interest rates in the range of 1-2%. Almost 40% of bank 
managers did not want to state their opinion on this issue. 
 
Is there diversity of 
interest rates? 
For on-sight deposits For time deposits 
a.) yes   
b.) no   
c.) do not approve such 
interests 
  
If it exists, what is the range? 
0.5-0.8%   
1% p.m. and more   
Up to 0.5% p.m.   
List the reasons for diversity of interest rates 
a.) amount of deposit   
b.) term   
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c.) arrangement 
operations 
  
d.) liquidity status of the 
bank 
  
e.) possibility and terms 
of financing 
  
f.) inexistence of other 
bank products 
  
g.) bank’s policy (whether 
it invests in safe 
businesses or not) 
  
Is this the case with other banks? 
a.) yes, a widespread 
practice 
  
b.) yes, individual cases 
only 
  
c.) do not know   
 
56% of bankers see as opportunity that persons who are currently given financial 
loans on the black market can be included into the banking sector, but a 
necessary condition for their inclusion is the guarantee of confidentiality of data, 
which is not enabled under the Law on Money Laundering Prevention (38.46%), 
then state abolition through the tax on excess profit (30.77%), more active role of 
banks in attracting that capital (15.38%), lower tax rates (7.69%) and lower fixed 
costs (7.69%). 
The main reason for performing a part of the financial operations on the black 
market and not over the account is tax evasion. With regard to taxes, 50% of 
banks put sales tax in first place, and taxes and contributions on wages in 
second place. Excises are still on a high third place, followed by property tax, 
financial transaction tax, local community tax, and finally personal income tax. 
Respondents assessed trade (56%), production of tobacco, alcohol and coffee 
(20%), construction (12%) and tourism (8%) to be dominant activities on the 
black market. 
 
 
Institutional Topic 
 
Professor Ph.D. Gordana Ilic-Popov 
 
WHAT DOES THE NEW LAW ON TAX PROCEDURE AND TAX 
ADMINISTRATION BRING TO SERBIA? 
 
 
 
Continuing with the implementation of radical reforms of the tax system, the 
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia has enacted recently the Law on 
Tax Procedure and Tax Administration (Official Gazette RS, no. 80/2002), which 
is to come into effect as of January 1, 2003. By this, Serbia has obtained one 
comprehensive procedural law which “disburdens” material tax laws which 
regulate in detail individual taxes included in the tax structure. The provisions of 
this Law codify the procedure of assessment, collection and control of public 
revenues. 
The Law on Tax Procedure and Tax Administration primarily aims at joining all 
activities in the process of assessment, collection and control of taxes and other 
public revenues together in one state office which will be called the Republic’s 
Tax Administration. Namely, the existence of dual tax administration so far, in the 
form of the Payment and Settlement Bureau (ZOP) and the Republic’s Public 
Revenues Administration (RJUP) to a significant extent hindered efficient 
administration of the state’s finances and provided room and possibility for tax 
evasion. 
The control of taxes and social insurance contributions which are paid after 
deductions and which was performed by the ZOP was more or less routine, 
because ZOP only made a comparison between the sum of income paid out 
(primarily salaries and author’s fees) and the data on the total of calculated fiscal 
obligations. In other words, this meant that the ZOP did not deal with analytical 
examination, i.e. it did not examine whether the employer, i.e. any other income-
payer as a taxpayer, calculated and paid tax for each individual employee, i.e. 
any other tax payer. On the other hand, the RJUP had the duty to assess and 
collect only those taxes which are, on the basis of the data on tax returns, 
established through issuance of a tax statement by the office in charge of 
taxation (corporate income tax, tax on income from independent activity, annual 
personal income tax, property tax, etc.). Accordingly, the RJUP did not have at its 
disposal the data on revenues from taxes which are paid after deductions, and 
which are, in view of their fiscal significance, much more abundant. 
After transferring payment operations from the ZOP to commercial banks, the 
Tax Administration will have a hard task to provide efficient collection of public 
revenues (tax on wages, tax on author’s fees and other sorts of income which 
are charged after deductions), which will be subject to the regime of self-taxation. 
“Self-taxation” is an obligation of an income payer to submit on his/her own a tax 
return and to do the calculation and payment of particular obligations to a 
corresponding account. After that, the task of Tax Administration will be to record 
all payments and to pursue strict control over the procedure performed by the 
payer in the calculation of a certain tax.  
The new Law will create conditions for Serbia to have a modern, responsible and 
qualified tax administration, which will be, in organizational terms, a part of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy of the Republic of Serbia. 
A special novelty brought about by the Law on Tax Procedure and Tax 
Administration concerns an obligatory introduction of a tax identification number 
(PIB) both for legal entities and entrepreneurs, as well as for citizens. The 
significance of the PIB lies in that each payment order submitted to a commercial 
bank must contain this number, and commercial banks will not be allowed to 
open an account for any person (neither legal entity and entrepreneur, nor 
physical person) that does not produce a personal tax number when applying for 
an account opening, which would make it possible for this person to be identified 
in all tax operations. The registration of taxpayers will enable Serbia to finally get 
a comprehensive register of taxpayers. 
Aiming at efficient work of the Tax Administration, the Center for Large 
Taxpayers will be founded for those tax payers which, due to their great fiscal 
significance for the Republic should be subjected to special tax control. In this 
way the largest and the most influential, whether economically or politically, will 
not be overlooked for taxation. 
Serbia should get a tax information system which would facilitate introduction of 
complex types of taxes such as synthesized personal income taxes and value 
added taxes. 
The Law on Tax Procedure and Tax Administration introduces a completely new 
measure which concerns cross-assessment of the tax base for two types of 
taxes, i.e. personal income tax and property tax. The data on property could be 
of assistance in discovering possible irregularities in filling a personal income tax 
return, as it will not be easy for a taxpayer who registers low income to explain 
how he/she got into the possession of property of greater value. In that respect, 
the Tax Administration will, as of 2004, have the right to compare the growth of 
taxpayer’s property with registered income, which would enable it to establish 
what portion of income the taxpayer, either physical person or entrepreneur, has 
not reported to the tax authorities. The tax base for personal income tax can be 
estimated as the difference between the value of net assets at the end and at the 
beginning of one calendar year, multiplied by the estimated expenditures for 
private needs on one hand, and reported income on the other. Taxpayers whose 
property (flat, house, business premises, garage, land, etc.; shares and stocks in 
legal entities; equipment for performing business activity as self-employed; motor 
vehicles, vessels and aircraft; works of art; saving deposits cash money etc.), in 
the country and abroad, exceeds YuD 20 million will be obliged to submit a 
special statement to record that property with the Tax Administration by June 30, 
2003 at the latest. Otherwise, every difference between the increase in property 
and reported income, which the taxpayer is not able to support with appropriate 
documents will be subjected to taxation as “other income”, without 
acknowledgement of standardized costs. The effect of this measure will be to 
ensure that personal income tax of wealthy citizens cannot be lower than the 
amount obtained by applying certain formula, based on indications of taxpayer’s 
wealth and luxurious life style. A similar anti-evasion measure exist in France in 
cases when the tax office suspects that reported income of the taxpayer does not 
correspond to his/her actual living standard. The tax official then assesses tax on 
the basis of presumed income, which is multiplied by the appropriate coefficients 
which indicate the taxpayer’s luxurious life style (house service, private airplane, 
yacht, luxurious car, horses, membership in a golf club, hunting license, etc.) 
The Law on Tax Procedure and Tax Administration brings with it not only a range 
of obligations put forward with the aim to protect the fiscal interest of the state, 
but it also introduces certain rights. This primarily concerns the right to obtain 
free information on tax regulations from the Tax Administration, the right to 
privacy, the right to access information the Tax Administration holds about a 
particular taxpayer and the right to revise inaccurate or incomplete data, the right 
to be present during tax control, the right to a written answer to the question 
asked about the personal tax situation, etc. It is good that the Law contains 
certain guarantees for those rights of taxpayers to be actually respected, in the 
form of prescribing penalties in the amount of YuD 5,000 – 20,000 for offences 
made by persons in charge and officials in the Tax Administration who violate 
any of the taxpayer’s rights with their actions. 
Pursuant with the taxpayer’s own written and argued claim that the payment of 
taxes on the day due poses an inappropriately heavy burden, i.e. creates 
considerable economic damage, the taxpayer is entitled to special tax relief in the 
form of a single postponement or payment of taxes in installments (up to 12 
months at the longest). 
Following the expiration of the transitional regime, i.e. as of December 31, 2003, 
the Republic of Serbia will be obliged, as any other private creditor, to register its 
statutory security right to real estate, movable property, financial assets and 
claims of a taxpayer into the proper register. This will eliminate the possibility for 
the state as a fiscal taxpayer to be in a privileged position in the collection of tax 
revenues which used to have priority for collection, relative to other creditors. 
Such a measure can give significant contribution to stimulating investments in the 
Serbian economy, because it provides better security to creditors. 
Changes are also introduced in the area of tax control, which is regulated so as 
to correspond to so-called “tax auditing”. This process distinguishes office 
control, field control and uncovering of tax felonies. Office control is a set of 
actions by which the Tax Administration checks the accuracy, completeness and 
harmonization with legal regulations of the data recorded in tax returns, tax 
statements, accounting reports and other records kept by a taxpayer. This form 
of control, as a rule, is performed by a tax inspector on the premises of the Tax 
Administration. Tax inspector, however, performs field control on the taxpayer’s 
premises on the basis of an issued control order. With an aim of battling crime 
with maximum efficiency in the area of public revenues (especially tax evasion, 
i.e. contraband), a practice observed in the former period, Serbia will get a Tax 
Police as a special organizational unit within the Tax Administration. The tax 
police will have authorizations similar to those held by MUP officials who work in 
uncovering criminal acts, only its work relates exclusively to uncovering tax 
felonies and their perpetrators. The following tax felonies are postulated under 
the Law on tax evasion: not paying tax on income after deductions; creation or 
submission of forged documents relevant for taxation; jeopardizing tax collection 
and tax control; illicit sale of excise products. 
The tax administration is given the possibility to ask for legal assistance in tax 
matters from state offices and organizations, organizations of territorial autonomy 
and local self-governance which are officially obliged to produce facts relevant for 
assessing tax duties and which they discover by pursuing activities in their 
competence. Moreover, under the condition of reciprocity, the Tax Administration 
may ask for legal assistance from foreign tax offices during the taxation 
procedure, as well as from tax offices from the Republic of Montenegro. 
International legal assistance will ensure better application of the principle of 
taxation of resident taxpayers on the basis of their world income, i.e. world 
assets, and more efficient realization of cross-assessment of the tax base. 
The Law on Tax Procedure and Tax Administration should improve financial 
discipline in Serbia. It is the responsibility of the Tax Administration to provide 
efficient implementation of tax control, as well as to ensure the rights of 
taxpayers and to prevent any form of inappropriate behavior or possible abuse by 
tax inspectors and the inspectors of the tax police. 
Institutional Topic II 
 
Ljubica Nikolic, Ph.D. 
 
REFORM OF THE SYSTEM OF FINANCING OF PENSION FUNDS  
 
The Existing System of Financing of Pensions  
 
During the last ten years, the world has encountered an increasingly notable 
problem of pension system financing, which, as in our country, is organized 
exclusively as a pay-as-you-go system. Such funds proved to be inefficient since 
they provide increasingly less security to insured persons. The model of 
exclusively pay-as-you-go pension funds can be successful only under stable 
economic activity which generates solid wages. The oscillations in economic 
growth rates and in the number of employed directly reflect on the operation of 
such pension funds and on the material status of pensioners. Many countries, 
both in Western and in Central and East Europe, including our country, have 
reported constant increase in the ratio of pensioners to the employed. Because 
of identified problems, the World Bank proposes the reform of pension systems 
through the introduction of several pillars (sources) of financing.  
According to both local and foreign experience, a pension system cannot be 
stable if it relies only on one pillar, i.e. source of financing. A multipillar pension 
system provides dispersion of risk and greater stability. Therefore, it is proposed 
that the pay-as-you-go pension system in which the currently economically active 
population sets aside means for paying out the pensions of current pensioners, 
be abandoned in favor of a pension system with several sources of financing 
(pillars): I pillar – mandatory, pay-as-you-go, defined benefit pension system 
(based on contributions), II pillar – fully funded, mandatory defined contribution 
system (based on individually capitalized savings), and III pillar – voluntary 
pension. 
Every pension system is expected to provide old age security. The amount of 
pension depends on previously paid contributions to the pension fund, which are 
multiplied by certain index with the passage of time, with a guarantee of a certain 
minimal pension. Different systems are in force in order to meet these 
requirements: 
• Hungary, Poland, Switzerland, Denmark and the Netherlands have the 
systems in which contributions are accumulated and invested by one or 
more pension funds on the securities market. The return of these assets 
depends on the level of development and trends on financial markets. 
• In another system, contributions are deposited to pension accounts, while 
the pension received depends only on previously paid contributions, 
multiplied by a certain index which depends on the financial markets. Such 
a system exists in Sweden and Latvia. 
• In Serbia and Montenegro, the amount of pension received depends on 
the average wage in the last several years of employment, multiplied by a 
certain index. Such a system does not stimulate payment of old age 
pension contributions. 
 
The Necessity of Reform 
 
Previous reform of the pension system in Serbia involved the reduction of the 
pension insurance contribution rate from 32% to 19.6%, increased retirement age 
and change in the methodology of calculating pensions so that pensions are now 
adjusted to trends in both wages and consumer prices. For the time being, there 
is a commitment to restructure the current system of pension financing of only 
the I pillar. Changes would concern the establishment of a closer link between 
pensions received and contributions paid.  At the same time, some steps have 
been taken in order to make possible the financing of the III pillar, i.e. voluntary 
pension insurance. However, as far as the II pillar is concerned, nothing has 
started yet for the following reasons: 1) high transition costs; 2) 
underdevelopment of capital markets; 3) lack of confidence in new funds and 
savings; and 4) technical problems in implementation. Such a position means 
postponement of the problem of pension financing and delay of the inevitable, i.e. 
system reforms. 
1.) Expenditures for the reform of the pension system should be considered 
an investment and not costs. This concerns significant investments with 
modest short-term and potentially great long-term effects. The example of 
Poland and Hungary shows that the effects of such investments result in 
decreased pressure on the budget for these purposes. The pension 
system itself can generate enough money if it is established properly. 
2.) Local securities markets are underdeveloped, especially the capital 
market, but this is exactly the market that can be stimulated by activating 
pension funds as institutional investors. At the same time, issuers should 
be stimulated to offer larger quantities of shares with emphasis on the role 
of the state as a potential issuer. State securities are likely to be the most 
attractive for new pension funds, and, on the other hand, by issuing 
bonds, the state will be able to cover a portion of means for financing 
pension system reform. 
3.) Restoration of confidence in all financial institutions, including new 
pension funds, is a matter of global economic policy and appropriate 
normative and institutional solutions. A lot of effort is necessary so as to 
regain that confidence, and the establishment of new funds requires 
caution in that respect, but this does not mean the postponing of reform. 
4.) The experience of those countries which are halfway into the reform of 
their pension systems can be of assistance in overcoming numerous 
problems which accompany every reform. 
The fiscal burden in our country is huge, pensions are financed from current 
revenues, and relative to wages, pensions in Serbia are the highest in the region.  
Low pensions are high with respect to wages, which are also low. We should 
also bear in mind the unfavorable ratio of the number of the employed to the 
number of pensioners – 1:1.5. This problematic ratio could be resolved in part by 
proper determination of the retirement age and retirement conditions. On the 
other hand, any extension of the working age is related to the problem of 
employment of young, educated, unemployed people. At first glance, the youth, 
companies, and even the entire economy are at loss. However, numerous 
researches confirm that shortening of the working age of the employed would 
result in a range of losses. Employers would lose experienced and reliable 
workers, the budget would be overburdened and the economy at loss, along with 
the retired persons themselves. Hence, the problem of unemployment should be 
resolved by creating new jobs, and not by early retirement of the employed. 
Unemployed young people should be provided with jobs that correspond to their 
qualifications.  
The problem of financing traditional state pension funds in our country has 
resulted in the situation that as little as 60% of pensions are paid out of the 
Republic’s budget, while the remainder is paid out of uncertain donations. This 
inevitably imposes the need for pension system reform. Pensions cannot be paid 
in the amounts higher than available funds allow, because this threatens other 
social groups. Because of very high tax and contribution rates, many local 
companies are evading these payments. Lower tax rates would bring about 
increased collection, because it is likely that many would not try to evade 
payment. Lower contribution rates could be applied on a wider base, which would 
result in greater amounts collected. In the future, pensions should be paid out 
from pension funds and not from current tax revenues. Pensions cannot rise in 
real terms without being supported by economic growth. 
How much time will reform take? The pension system reform in Hungary and 
Poland took six years, including two years spent on adopting the concept of 
reform. It took seven years in Sweden. In our country, the necessary set of 
reform laws and accompanying bylaws will likely be adopted in a much shorter 
period because we are in a position to benefit from the experience of others. 
Reform should begin as soon as possible, without copying ready-made solutions 
from other countries and uncritical acceptance of the opinions of foreign experts. 
It should be borne in mind that after the first several years of operation of the new 
system of pension funds, practical problems will arise and new adjustments will 
have to be made. While building the concept of pension reform, the needs of 
other social groups and not only those of pensioners should also be taken into 
consideration. 
 
Possible Directions of Reform 
 
In keeping with domestic needs, and in line with the experience of transition 
countries and expectations of international institutions, three local sources of 
pension financing should be implemented: 1. to maintain the existing mandatory 
pay-as-you-go defined benefit pension system (I pillar – mandatory basic 
insurance); 2. to introduce the fully-funded defined contribution system (II pillar – 
mandatory supplementary insurance), and 3. to introduce the system of voluntary 
pension insurance (III pillar). Hence, we propose a mixed pension system 
composed of three pillars: the first pillar is based on solidarity and is legally 
binding, the second and third pillars are based on capitalization of savings for old 
age, whereby the second pillar is mandatory, while the third one is a matter of 
citizens’ free choice. Reformed pension funds should function as a separate form 
of investment funds. 
The reform of the system of pension funds financing could evolve in the following 
way. At the beginning, a certain percentage (for example 2/3) of the contribution 
can be used for the first, already existing source of pension financing, while the 
remainder (1/3) can be used as the second pillar which is capitalized on financial 
markets.  Contributions invested in the second pillar would be funds owned by 
insured persons themselves. Insured persons should be given the opportunity to 
choose between several mandatory pension funds. The Fund selected by the 
insured person would invest one third of the contribution in the appropriate 
securities. Portfolio managers assess the profitability of investments, disperse 
the means of their beneficiaries in order to maximize profit with minimal risk. In 
this way, by fulfilling retirement conditions prescribed by Law, an insured person 
is provided with two pensions from different sources of financing. The third pillar 
of pension financing, based on voluntary pension insurance, should be 
developed concurrently. Development of this pillar is likely to take place in a 
relatively short time, while the development of the second pillar requires a longer 
period of time and fulfillment of numerous conditions. This does not mean that its 
implementation should be halted, but only that visible financial effects should not 
be expected in the near future.  
In the initial stages of reform, until pension funds start working as real institutional 
investors, they might hire investment managers to manage the investment of 
funds. Funds may count on the investment sectors of banks, independent 
investment managers and insurance companies. Of special significance could be 
insurance companies, which would establish special accounts for pension funds 
and manage the assets of these funds, keeping the tax relieves which must be 
allowed to pension funds. 
There are possibilities for the introduction of voluntary pension insurance, and 
this pillar is in gradual expansion1. It is expected that voluntary pension funds 
would be used first by successful companies for their workers, and if this proves 
to be a good solution, physical persons would also use them. Companies can be 
stimulated to use supplementary pension sources for their employees if they are 
offered adequate fiscal benefits. Voluntary insurance is a supplement to 
mandatory insurance, which will continue to exist. As domestic pensions have 
been insufficient and uncertain for several years, additional security of income for 
retirement is a real need for the majority of the population. Funds from the III 
pillar can be open-ended (for all citizens) or close-ended (for employees 
employed by a single employer or for groups of persons connected by a certain 
interest). Voluntary pension funds work in the same way as mandatory funds, 
whereby access to them is subject to free will, and beneficiaries themselves 
determine the amount of their monthly contributions to the fund. Such a solution 
                                                 
1 The first local private pension fund was founded by “Dunav osiguranje” and a Dutch company TBIH 
which has vast experience in managing private pension funds. The ownership ratio in this joint company is 
51:49 in favor of the foreign partner. 
would enable domestic pensioners to receive pensions form the I pillar, a portion 
from the II and from the III pillar, if they have been depositors of voluntary 
pension funds. 
We should be careful with the introduction of private pension funds for voluntary 
deposits of citizens. The appropriate regulation framework and control should 
maximally protect potential insurance beneficiaries. 
 
Prerequisites for Efficient Reform 
 
It is necessary to fulfill a range of prerequisites before implementing the reform of 
the pension system. The success of the new pension pillar (II pillar) is subject to 
macroeconomic stability, simulative fiscal policy, appropriate legal and 
institutional infrastructure and political stability. Since these conditions are related 
to uncertainty, especially regarding the first and the last condition, it is irrational 
to expect that the new types of pension funds will start further to fulfill these 
conditions. In our opinion, the second pillar should be set up as soon as possible, 
at the same time as efforts are made on fulfilling the mentioned condition. 
Therefore, we should not expect significant results in the first stages of 
implementation of the new pension system. Reformist activities should start right 
away, but visible results are likely only after two years. 
The main obstacle to the development of the second pillar in our country refers to 
underdeveloped capital markets. Initial mistrust in new pension funds is also 
likely, and it will take some time to restore citizens’ confidence in savings and to 
strengthen preferences towards future spending. It is therefore necessary to take 
coordinated actions in order to strengthen the overall financial market and the 
stability of the macroeconomic environment. 
The legal infrastructure is also needed. The basis for a future concept of the 
pension system should be the new Law on Pension Insurance, and the Law on 
Mandatory and Voluntary Pension Funds that should follow, including regulation 
of the payment of pensions based on a fully funded system. There is greater 
need for security in pension funds than in any other investment funds because 
these assets serve as a guarantee of social security of the fund’s members and 
their families. Therefore the regulations on investing of pension funds must be 
restrictive, with the aim to reduce risk and generate more secure gains. 
The main objective of funded funds is to generate means  which will be the basis 
for income in old age. It is therefore necessary to establish the principles of 
investing (security and diversity of investments, maintenance of a certain liquidity 
requirement level), limitations with regard to the kind of property in which it is 
possible to invest the assets of a pension fund, as well as the maximum level  
(%) of investment in particular kinds of property. To protect investors, the Law 
should postulate precisely that the assets of a pension fund must be invested in 
low risk investments, primarily in state bonds. If laws insist that a large portion of 
a fund’s assets must be invested in long-term bonds or other long-term securities 
issued by the state or the central bank, this would stimulate the development of a 
capital market, and the funds’ assets would be invested in the safest 
investments. State bonds are considered to be investments with the lowest risk, 
while through the sale of bonds to pension funds the state budget would be able 
to provide a portion of funds to cover transitional costs of pension reform. The 
investment of assets of pension funds in securities which are not traded on an 
organized market should be prohibited, as well as in inalienable forward 
operations activities. 
Should investing of the capital of a pension fund in foreign countries be 
prohibited? The prohibition of such investments boost the feeling of security of 
those who invest in the funds, but at the same time, it limits the possibility of 
capital growth of the funds. Therefore, investing in foreign markets should be 
allowed only for one portion of the fund’s assets and in only limited amounts. 
Such a solution has been accepted in most transition countries. 
The accompanying institutional infrastructure. Successful work of modern 
pension funds cannot be imagined without efficient institutions. One such 
institution is the central register of insured persons which would keep records of 
the balances of personal pension accounts of pension funds’ beneficiaries. A 
Control Agency as the main regulatory and supervisory body of the Government 
would monitor the reform and legality of operations of pension funds and pension 
associations. Pension insurance companies and specialized insurance 
companies would take care of the payment of pensions.  
 
Pension Funds as Institutional Investors 
 
The investing of assets of pension funds in securities depends on the situation on 
financial markets. The experience of transition countries indicates that reformed 
pension funds started investing carefully in securities. In order to ensure real 
(market) valuation of a fund, investment of a pension fund’s assets in property 
whose value cannot be determined on the organized market (e.g. shares which 
are not traded on the market) must be prohibited. To protect the value of assets 
on personal accounts in case of low return, beneficiaries of mandatory funds 
should be assured a certain amount of guaranteed return. Guaranteed return is 
an institution which exists in practice and for this institution mandatory pension 
funds differ from other funds, where there are no guarantees as a rule. For 
example, the value of an investment fund comes from the market value of its 
portfolio and these funds do not have fixed, guaranteed return. For the III pillar, 
as a rule, guaranteed return is not prescribed, but members of voluntary pension 
funds are generally entitled to certain state incentives and tax exemptions. 
The investment of pension funds’ assets can intensify turnover on the market. To 
what extent this could be achieved in our country depends on the future concept 
of the domestic pension system and total trends on the financial market. Modern 
pension systems imply a range of connected institutions, which could be based 
on institutions that are yet to be mentioned in this article. 
The establishment and administration of pension funds is performed by pension 
associations. They are founded as joint stock companies or limited liability 
companies. The founders of a pension fund are issued a permit by the Control 
Agency (or other competent institution) to start up their company and after paying 
the founding capital and registration in the court registry, the pension association 
must obtain permission for work from the Agency. Founding capital must be 
higher if a pension association manages a mandatory pension fund, or smaller if 
it manages a voluntary pension fund. A pension association’s assets are 
registered separately from the fund’s assets, since ownership over those assets 
is separated. The insured person may be a member of only one mandatory fund, 
while membership in voluntary funds is not limited. 
A pension fund is owned by its beneficiaries. The fund is founded and 
administrated by pension associations with the purpose of collecting 
contributions of fund beneficiaries and investing these means in order to increase 
their value. Each beneficiary of the fund participates in the ownership of the fund 
in proportion to the deposits on the personal account. The insurance 
beneficiaries freely choose the pension fund in which they open their accounts. 
Beneficiaries of the II pillar opt for one of the available mandatory pension funds 
by submitting an application to the Central Register of insured persons. Insured 
persons should be allowed the right to change their fund at any moment, paying 
compensation to their former fund. An insured person may be a member of only 
one mandatory fund, with no limitations regarding voluntary funds. 
The monitoring and capitalization of paid contributions is insured by initiating 
personal accounts of insured persons. Employers and other contributors pay a 
certain percentage of the gross salary to the personal account of insured 
persons. In the III pillar, insured persons or their employers pay contributions 
directly to the voluntary pension fund. The introduction of a personal account is in 
the interest of insured persons and their social security, providing that: 1.) assets 
in the account are owned by the insured persons; 2.) those assets are protected 
from bankruptcy and liquidation and can be used only as pensions; 3.) the 
account is permanent until retirement, not depending on the changes of one’s job 
or temporary interruption in contribution dynamics; 4.) insured persons can check 
on a regular basis the balance on their account, which stimulates payment of 
contributions; 5.) there is a possibility of choice of pension fund and negotiability 
of accounts. Assets from a personal account are being transferred in the case of 
changing membership, retirement or death of the fund’s beneficiary. Then the 
assets are transferred either to another fund or to a pension insurance company 
for payment of the pension. If the fund’s beneficiary passes away and family 
members do not have survivor’s rights, the assets are subject to inheritance. 
With the transfer of assets, membership in a given fund ends. 
A pension fund’s property must be kept in a separate account in a deposit bank 
which provides higher security and impartiality in its valuation, as well as 
distinction of that property from the property of the pension association. The 
deposit bank evaluates a fund’s property and provides the pension association 
with other services for which it charges a certain fee to the fund. 
The Control Agency carries out control over the operation of a fully funded 
system of pension insurance. The main task of the Agency is to protect the 
interests of pension funds’ members and beneficiaries of a fully funded 
mandatory defined contribution pension system. The agency approves and 
cancels working licenses to pension associations, carries out control over the 
operations of pension associations, pension funds and the central register of 
insured persons, stimulates the development of fully funded pension insurance, 
prepares bylaws and initiates amendments to legislation in this area. 
The Central Register of insured persons as a technical center of a modern 
pension system should: insure efficient flow of money and data between different 
subjects in the system, keep records, i.e. databases, in order to ensure reliable 
and rational operation of the pension system and its control. Employers and other 
contribution payers inform the Central Register of individual salaries and 
contributions paid for each insured person according to each payment. The 
Central Register forwards paid contributions to particular pension funds in which 
insured persons are members, keep record of data on personal accounts of 
pension fund’s members. Centralized collection of contributions and information 
systems with the central databases on insured persons and contribution payers 
ensures the availability of data, more rational and reliable operation of the 
pension system, at the same time as providing data for more rational 
performance and control in other systems (tax, health, employment). 
 
The main tasks of the Central Register would be the following: 
• Collection of contributions and information on the insured person’s salary 
from the employer and other contribution payers; 
• Record keeping necessary for the control of contribution payments; 
• Submitting the request to the tax administration to start the procedure of 
court enforcement of contributions; 
• Record keeping on personal accounts of members of mandatory pension 
funds. 
• Reporting to members of mandatory pension funds on contributions paid 
and the balance of their personal account. 
• The transfer of contributions to pension funds and reports to pension 
associations and pension insurance companies; 
• Procedure of transfer of assets from personal accounts in the case of 
change of membership or retirement. 
• Record keeping necessary for efficient work of a fully funded system and 
for control. 
The Central Register should be authorized to carry out, according to contract, 
other operations on behalf of voluntary pension associations. 
Constitutional Charter 
 
Getting Closer to The European Union - One Step Forward Or Three Steps 
Backwards? 
 
During the process of adoption of the Constitutional Charter of the Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro, it was often stressed that the Charter will reportedly help 
and accelerate the integration of our country with the European Union. In line 
with this, every compromise which in the process of adoption of the Charter 
seems to be to the detriment of Serbia and to the advantage of Montenegro 
hides behind requests made by the European Union. 
Do these compromises and constitutional solutions really contribute to our swifter 
integration with the European Union, or do they make it even more distant? What 
is the real impact of the Constitutional Charter on the future cooperation between 
Serbia and the world? 
Since there is agreement that membership in the EU is our long-term objective 
and that the entire project of this state union came about because of the EU, then 
we should certainly begin with the question of the conditions which one country 
must fulfill to become an EU member. These conditions were defined in 1993 
when the following economic and political criteria were set before countries that 
wished to become EU members (Copenhagen criteria): 
1. Stable institutions which guarantee democracy, the rule of law, respect of 
human and minority rights; 
2. Market economy which is able to sustain competition that exists in EU 
countries; 
3. Ability of a country to take on the obligations that come with membership, 
including the pursuance of the objectives of political, economic and 
monetary Union. 
What is Serbia doing to meet these criteria? 
Serbia is adopting the Constitutional Charter which is contrary to the first 
condition requiring stable institutions. By giving concessions to Montenegro, 
Serbia is establishing a state union and institutions that are not known in modern 
history. The concept of a “joint state” with two currencies and two completely 
separate markets and consensual decision making in a union composed of two 
member states which are completely asymmetrical, both in terms of size and of 
interests, guarantees nothing but inefficiency and hindrance of the decision 
making process. Moreover, Serbia transfers its entire international subjectivity 
and cooperation to the union with Montenegro, setting up institutions which, by 
their organization, structure and administration (parity in sharing of power and 
consensual decision making), fully threaten the realization of Serbia’s interests in 
international relations. For example, the Ministry for International Economic 
Relations takes on authority in all areas of international cooperation, except 
military and home affairs and human rights. Thus, this Ministry should take over 
the role of a fiscal agent in international financial institutions, and carry out 
activities related to cooperation with the EU, the World Health Organization, the 
World Trade Organization and all other organizations that deal with cooperation 
in the area of agriculture, economy, transportation, energy, environment, etc. It is 
obvious that such a Ministry, by its very organization and competences, cannot 
ensure stable functioning. The Minister who is to be the head of this Ministry will 
have to possess superhuman knowledge and skills in order, for example, to 
manage to negotiate the conditions for drawing credit from the World Bank, 
conditions under which we will export our veal to the EU market and conditions 
necessary for operating the civil air transportation at the same time. This 
institutional solution is not sustainable, and if it were, than every country would 
have only a prime minister and there would not be a need for different ministries. 
Another problem that constitution-makers overlooked is the fact that it takes a 
long period of time to build up institutions, and that human resources educated 
for specialized areas of international cooperation are scarce. If these people are 
engaged to work within a inadequate organizational pattern which is already 
limited in its existence to only three years, and if they are forced to carry out 
impossible tasks, those few experts we have will abandon the state 
administration. Instead of strengthening human resources in the country, we will 
face the reverse process. 
The prescribed mechanism of decision making in such institutions, i.e. the 
principle of consensus – namely the right of the smaller republic (5%) to make 
decisions on the destiny of the bigger one (95%), certainly does not contribute to 
the stability of institutions, but, on the contrary, brings about the possibility of total 
collapse of their work and jeopardizes further development of Serbia, which is the 
bigger and more developed member state. 
The process of adoption of the Belgrade Agreement and the Constitutional 
Charter showed this mechanism to be a failure, with both sides lacking goodwill 
for building the joint state. If daily decisions are to be agreed in this way in the 
future, it may be safely assumed that the future Ministerial Council of the joint 
state might come to agreement about some key issues once in six months, at 
best. Maybe the decision-making process could be faster, but only providing that 
there are permanent concessions of one side. So far this feel to the side of 
Serbia, for the most part.1 
Some politicians deceived the public by saying that delay in the adoption of 
Constitutional Charter puts us further away from the European Union, which, 
again, jeopardizes the living standard of our citizens. What politicians forget to 
mention in such statements is that the beginning of negotiations on the 
stabilization and association agreement do not require only the Constitutional 
Charter, but much more. Namely, in order to start negotiations, it is necessary to 
create an Action Plan for harmonization of economic systems of Serbia and 
Montenegro, which would provide common economic space (customs, trade, 
                                                 
1 This was especially shown in the adoption of Constitutional Law, when the Serbian side accepted that the 
activities of the fiscal agent to the IMF be temporarily performed by the  Ministry for International 
Economic Relations, and not by the National Bank of Serbia, only because Montenegro does not allow any 
institution which has Serbia in its name to be mentioned anywhere in performing joint activities. In this 
way some members of the Constitutional Commission, with full awareness, jeopardized our cooperation 
with the IMF, which has been successfully carried out by the National Bank. This shows that even those 
few institutions that have been reformed in Serbia might be destabilized through the process of creation of 
the new union of Serbia and Montenegro. 
banking, the entire economic environment) and common institutions – to sign the 
Agreement, it is necessary to implement the Action Plan. Montenegro insists that 
this process should last three years, while Serbia wishes it to be over as soon as 
possible, so as to be able to open negotiations on accession to the World Trade 
Organization and to sign the Association and Stabilization Agreement. This 
means that, although the Constitutional Charter was adopted, if Montenegro 
prolongs the harmonization of economic systems, there will be neither the 
Agreement, nor better living standards. 
Experience in negotiations on harmonization held so far after the Belgrade 
Agreement was signed does not instill optimism, but, on the contrary, indicates 
that a hard period of harmonization with Montenegro lies ahead for Serbia, as 
well as concrete losses in the economy2. Does this mean that Serbian 
representatives in full awareness have given up for three years the possibility of 
signing the Agreement with the EU which prevents Serbia from becoming a WTO 
member because Montenegro does not want to carry out harmonization prior to 
the three year term, i.e. until the moment it realizes its independence proclaimed 
at the highest state level. Montenegro is obviously ready to waste this time, 
which is not an actual loss for this Republic. With regard to the economic 
structure of Montenegro, which is based on the export of services and not on 
commodity exports, membership in the mentioned organizations and integration 
does not bring any significant benefit to the Montenegrin economy, in the way 
that it is beneficial for Serbia. The interests of Montenegro are justified, but what 
is going on with the interests of Serbia, and who represents them? 
There is another argument which indicates that the adoption of this Charter will in 
fact block our attempt to get closer to the EU. Since the entire world knows us as 
one country with one international subjectivity, all recommendations of the 
European Commission so far have required common regulations and common 
institutions on the overall territory. However, in opposition to this requirement, 
solutions from the Constitutional Charter introduce dual institutions and separate 
regulations. For example, the EU requires from us a common level of customs 
protection, common foreign trade regulations and common customs services. 
The Constitutional Charter, on the other hand, defines the existence of separate 
regulations and institutions, such as two Customs Administrations, and this is the 
case in all areas. It was clearly stated that the process would begin only when we 
achieve mutual economic and institutional unity, and anyone who claims that the 
Constitutional Charter brings us closer to the European Union deceives the 
public, either out of ignorance or out of other interests which are certainly not the 
interests of the development of the Serbian economy. Anomalies in the 
Constitutional Charter which put us further from the EU should be revised in the 
Action Plan for harmonization of two economic systems. Is this going to last three 
years and are we going to spend the entire period in establishing functional 
                                                 
2 The attempt of accelerated harmonization of customs rates in the area of textiles, aimed at concluding the 
bilateral Textiles Agreement, which is of great significance for Serbia, is still continuing. The 
Constitutional Charter has no influence on this process, but Montenegro did not want to meet Serbia 
halfway, despite the fact that Montenegro will suffer minimal or no damage at all from harmonization in 
this area, while it would be of great significance to the Serbian textiles industry. 
institutions as required by the international community? All of these imply that the 
union in such form will be more expensive, not only because of the absence of 
functionality in it, but also because of the missed opportunities from international 
cooperation. Therefore, the proclaimed will that we should give it a try and see 
whether this union is able to survive is sensible only if Serbia does not suffer 
damage during that period, but if damage exists and is already visible from the 
expert’s perspective, than enormous responsibility rests with politicians who 
accepted such a constitutional solution.  
 
The Belgrade Agreement was supposed to prevent the breakup of the state3. It 
contains forced political compromises with aspirations to put right all the 
anomalies of the Agreement in the future and goodwill during the creation of the 
Constitutional Charter, aiming to define a functional state union. However, this 
aim was not attained. Quite the opposite, what was created was a loose non-
functional joint state to which Serbia transfers its entire international subjectivity. 
Moreover, maintaining its own Minister for foreign affairs, although the Belgrade 
Agreement stipulates that foreign affairs would be transferred to the level of the 
union, Montenegro continues to send a clear message that its priority is to gain 
independence. Therefore, such a model of a state union, accompanied by 
constant blackmails and irrational demands on the part of Montenegro, not only 
threatens the functioning of Serbia as a state for itself, but also threatens Serbia 
as a state which aims at being integrated in the international community. 
Finally, in spite of significant efforts and attempts of Serbia and the EU to 
preserve this union, and despite compromises which were made in order to find 
models which will not threaten future independence of Montenegro during the 
existence of the union, costs become much higher and threaten the stability of 
Serbia. Among other things, the Constitutional Charter prompted sharpening of 
the conflict in the governing coalition in Serbia and wasted enormous energy on 
endless meetings with Montenegrin delegations, which were doomed to failure in 
advance, given their mandate (an independent Montenegro). This significantly 
slowed down reforms and opened a serious political crisis in Serbia. 
Bearing in mind everything advanced so far, and especially the fact that 
institutional solutions defined in the Charter may jeopardize both international 
cooperation and further reforms in Serbia, it is becoming increasingly obvious 
that Serbia will be forced to provide to itself an independent and stable path 
towards accession to European and international integrations. 
                                                 
3 Since Montenegro has already completed its economic and legal system, it could rather be said that the 
Belgrade Agreement should have integrated the two states and not preserved one state. 
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HEADING TOWARD THE FIFTH ENLARGEMENT OF  
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
The Council of the European Union (EU) as an institution responsible for the 
adoption of primarily general political guidelines and for shaping EU policies, at 
the Summit held on December 12 and 13 in Copenhagen made another in a 
series of its historical decisions which has been looked forward to with as much 
enthusiasm as fear. Namely, on the basis of the proposal of the European 
Commission (of 09.12.2002.), 15 members of the Union agreed to bring to a 
conclusion a long lasting process of accession negotiations, and, as of May 1, 
2004, the EU will have as many as ten new members. Thus, in less than two 
years the Union will admit to its membership five CEE countries (Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia), three Baltic countries 
(Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) and two European Mediterranean countries 
(Malta and Cyprus). 
As we are now at the end of the process which has lasted for about fifteen years, 
during which the EU has also created its new enlargement policy, it would be 
good to recall its evolution. The reason for this is practical: to see that the path 
towards the EU is not at all easy and simple, and especially that this process is 
long and expensive, at the same time as pointing out that the same or similar 
developments lie ahead of Serbia and Montenegro. 
 
The EU Enlargement Policy 
 
 
Compared with the existing joint and common policies that the Union has 
developed over fifty years of its existence, the enlargement policy is by all means 
the newest and the most specific one. It does not regulate only one area (as is 
the case with the common agricultural policy or structural policy), nor does it 
allow for only one form of a political process. This policy is most often considered 
to be a composit policy, as it comprises at least two dimensions: a macro level 
(establishment of general objectives and parameters of an enlargement policy) 
and a mid-level (at which specific details and essence, i.e. contents of this policy 
are defined). Work on both levels of enlargement policy implies also interference 
in the elements of other joint or common policies of the Union. 
The EU did not have a need to create an enlargement policy earlier, although the 
membership of this organization has been increased occasionally. The Union has 
experienced four waves of enlargement so far: accession of the UK, Denmark 
and Ireland in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986 and Austria, 
Finland and Sweden in 1995. The EU also enlarged its territory and population 
after the unification of the two Germanys, but this is considered to be an 
unofficial enlargement. Reasons for the absence of the need to create a common 
enlargement policy and to define concrete conditions for EU membership are 
obvious – all new members were Western European countries, bearing similar 
features and values as the founding countries of the three European 
communities. The Union was responding individually to individual problems 
encountered by some of these countries (consolidation of democracy, especially 
in Greece, as well as significant economic problems in Spain and Portugal). 
However, the upcoming, fifth enlargement of membership is without precedent as 
it implies an increase in the Union’s population by 100 million new nationals and 
a 30% increase of the size of its territory. However, much more important than 
this obvious enlargement is the fact that new members have different historical, 
economic, cultural and political experiences, both in relation to each other and to 
the EU Member States. This is why it is necessary to define relations between 
new candidates and the Union in a new and different way. 
 
A Basis: The Implementation of Association Agreements 
 
Common characteristics of all countries which accede to the Union are that all of 
them concluded different forms of Association Agreements with the European 
Union, and earlier with the EEC, according to Article 310 (ex. 238) of the EC 
Agreement. The Community signed the first agreements of this type with 
European Mediterranean countries, first with Greece (1961; Greece became an 
EC member before the implementation of the Agreement), Turkey (1963), Malta 
(1970) and Cyprus (1972). These Association Agreements brought about the 
establishment of a customs union between the EEC and these countries, as well 
as mutual trade liberalization, and opened the possibility for these countries to 
become EEC members. 
After the end of the cold war and the fall of the Berlin wall (November 1989), 
Central and East European (CEE) contraries started the process of transition, 
and one of the main characteristics of this process was the approach of these 
countries toward European integration. The EU gave support to this process, as 
it was “…in full compliance with the basic objective of this organization, which is 
defined as the defense of liberal democracy and the market economy, with the 
main emphasis being on overcoming the division of the continent” (Summit of the 
European Council, Rhodes, 1988). However, it was not that clear from the 
beginning that the Union would have such a dominant role in the process of 
transition of CEE countries, but it was simply forced to take on that role. The 
main factors that defined the primary role of the Union are external factors: firstly, 
the governments of transition countries which have shaped the goals of their 
foreign policies and internal tasks in compliance with basic values of European 
integration; of no less importance is the American factor, i.e. the influence of the 
US administration, which significantly supported such developments. 
The first steps were the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EU 
and these countries, removal of long lasting quotas for imports from CEE 
countries, and extension of the system of the General Preferential Scheme to 
these countries. The European Commission was assigned the widest role in the 
normalization of relations and in defining necessary assistance. The Commission 
created and negotiated the Agreement on Trade and Cooperation, under which 
CEE countries became new trade partners of the EU. The next significant 
contribution of the Commission was the promotion of the program of technical 
and financial assistance for reforms (the PHARE program started in 1989 only for 
Poland and Hungary at first, but later extended to all other countries in transition) 
and the establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), which approves public loans to these countries as long as 
they do not have access to private direct investments. 
Attempts to create long range, more comprehensive and closer relations with 
CEE countries made by the governments of Germany and the United Kingdom 
were disrupted and halted not only because of the issues that were on the 
agenda of the European integration itself (negotiations and Inter-governmental 
Conference for the adoption of the Mastricht Agreement, the creation of the 
European Monetary Union, etc.), but also because of the impossibility of finding 
the answer to the question how to include these countries into the integration 
flows of the EU. Because of this, the concepts of the European Confederation (as 
presented by President Miterrand) and the European Political Area (proposed by 
France Andriessen, the Commission member in charge of foreign affairs) did not 
meet with support in the Union. 
A more moderate idea proposed by the Government of the United Kingdom in 
1989 was accepted: to create a new type of international contract on accession 
which is defined as “…a new pattern of relations in Europe” (special meeting of 
the European Council, April 1990). Thus a new form of Association Agreement 
was created. Due to great political significance of these agreements and the 
return of these states to their base, they were titled European Agreements (EA). 
These Agreements were concluded between 1991 (the first agreements with 
Hungary and Poland) and 1996 (the last agreement signed with Slovenia) 
separately with each of the ten CEE and Baltic countries (with Bulgaria, 
Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993, and with Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania in 1995). The main goal of the European Agreements was to create a 
free trade area between the Union and these countries on the basis of 
reciprocity, asymmetrically and gradually (with a projected period of ten years 
divided into two stages). Namely, this concerns the economic, social, political 
and cultural bringing closer of these countries to the Union, which involves areas 
such as political cooperation, appropriate trade relations, economic activities and 
cultural cooperation, with necessary harmonization of national legislation of 
associated states with community law (especially areas relating to internal 
markets). The European Agreements permitted associated countries access to 
trade preferentials and benefits otherwise available to EU members only, 
providing free trade in industrial products (except for agricultural products, 
textiles and steel), free movement of services, capital and people, and removal of 
customs and all quantitative restrictions. Special accession institutions were set 
up for implementing the Agreement: the Association Council (monitors the 
processes of harmonization with community law), the Association Committee 
(regulates implementation of certain areas of the agreement), and the 
Parliamentary Committee for Association (the center of political dialogue of the 
EU and applicant countries). The PHARE program remains the main financial 
instrument in the strategy of preparing CEE countries for membership. 
Although the European Agreements are the most comprehensive agreements 
concluded by the Union so far, the contracting partner, i.e. CEE countries were 
not very satisfied with them. Namely, the most common objection referred to the 
economic contents of the agreements, in particular because of slower and limited 
liberalization in trade with “sensitive” products – agricultural products, textiles, 
coal and steel, which are the main exporting products of these countries. Another 
reason is political as the European Agreements do not stipulate clear obligation 
of the EU to accord these countries membership, since membership is defined as 
an ultimate goal, while “…association, in the opinion of contracting parties, 
provides assistance in attaining this goal” (Preamble of the European 
Agreements). 
 
The Criteria for EU Membership 
 
Taking advantage of imprecise provisions of the Association Agreements, both 
the European Agreements and agreements concluded with European 
Mediterranean countries, all associated countries applied for membership in the 
EU immediately after having ratified agreements. This raised a new problem 
before the Union, that is, to define what criteria must be fulfilled for one country to 
become a member. Founding treaties have defined explicitly only the main 
condition, which is that a country must be located in Europe. Precise criteria were 
to be defined by heads of states and governments of the EU countries at the 
Summit held in Copenhagen in 1993. This Summit was a key step both for 
relations with CEE and for the creation of the EU association policy. Namely, the 
Union accepted future membership of these states, establishing that associated 
countries would become EU members as soon as they were able to accept the 
obligation deriving from membership in relation to economic, legal and political 
conditions. These conditions (accession criteria) are the following: the stability of 
institutions which guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human and minorities 
rights; the establishment of a market economy (competition in particular) and the 
acceptance of acquis communitaire (according to the classification of the areas 
of community commercial legislation enlisted in the White Paper which was 
adopted in 1995). Another condition was added later, which is the existence of 
efficient administrative structures necessary for the implementation of these 
agreements. 
 
Agenda 2000 
 
The meeting of the European Council held in Madrid in December 1995 is of 
great significance for further developments towards the enlargement of the EU 
and the creation of its enlargement policy. Namely, heads of states and 
governments for the first time raised the question of fitting in for each candidate 
into the general enlargement framework, with cost–benefit analysis of the 
increase of its membership. Therefore, they asked the Commission to prepare 
separate reports in response to these questions. In July 1997, the European 
Commission presented the Agenda 2000, a three-volume report and program of 
the future actions of the Union, which established a wider perspective for the 
development of the EU and defined its future financial framework, bearing in 
mind the challenges of enlargement. This important document covers four major 
areas: the Commission’s assessment of the candidate countries (which at that 
moment did not meet the criteria set in Copenhagen, while at the same time 
proposing a different approach to different groups of states); a provisional 
association strategy (which provides that the enforcement of the acquis must be 
ensured before the beginning of membership, accession assistance, etc.); the 
research of the impact of enlargement on the Union (especially the impact on 
agriculture and structural funds); and establishment of financial prospects of the 
EU for the period 2000-2006 (which stipulates that the response to financial costs 
must be redistribution of existing funds, and not the creation of new ones). 
 
The Process of Enlargement of Membership 
 
Such a comprehensive Report and the Commission’s recommendations resulted 
in the official beginning of a very complex process of the enlargement of 
membership. This process consists of several elements: a strategy for becoming 
a member (defined jointly by the EU and each candidate country, taking into 
account specific conditions in every candidate country), accession negotiations, 
the process of examining the acquis and the procedure of evaluation of the 
attained results in this process for each candidate country. 
During negotiations for membership for each associated country the conditions 
for becoming a member are defined, in particular the conditions related to 
adoption, implementation and enforcement of community legislation. The 
negotiations with first six candidates (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus) began in March 1998. The second wave of 
negotiations with Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Turkey started 
in February 2000. However, the division of candidate countries into two groups 
did not imply the order in which these countries would become EU members, but 
the EU applied a “regatta” approach, meaning that those states which 
successfully meet the criteria would become members regardless of when the 
negotiations had started. 
The process of analytical research of the community heritage includes the review 
of 31 areas of community law and procedures, and exposure of the candidate to 
what has been achieved so far in these areas at the level of the Union, since 
these are areas in which each candidate country must harmonize its legal 
system. Analytical research is gradual, so the last of these areas (agriculture, 
judiciary and home affairs, free movement of people, regional policy, financial 
control and budget) ”open”, i.e. start being discussed between the Union and 
candidate only at the very end of the negotiations. 
An important moment in the process of enlargement of the Union is evaluation of 
successfulness of each candidate country (which begins with the Agenda 2000) 
in the form of the European Commission’s evaluation – with respect to the 
general framework, but for each country separately. Practically, this means that 
the European Commission follows the developments in these countries, 
evaluating the situation on the basis of the defined accession criteria: political, 
economic and legal. Namely, within this process (which is known as the review 
process) the European Commission submits regular annual reports to the 
Council, and these reports serve as a basis which provides direction to the 
negotiations with each candidate country. The European Commission submitted 
its first regular reports in November 1998, and every year from then on. On the 
basis of the Commission’s review of the successfulness of candidates, decisions 
were adopted on concluding negotiations and on enlargement of the EU. 
 
Final Preparations for Membership 
 
What lies in front of both countries which are to become EU members and the 
Union itself is the creation of a draft and the conclusion of Accession 
Agreements, which should stand for a final compromise intended to provide easy 
integration of new members, at the same time as ensuring efficient functioning of 
the enlarged Union. It has been stipulated that after the creation of the Draft 
Agreement, the Commission’s opinion, consent from the European Parliament 
and the Council’s approval, this Agreement should be concluded in Athens on 
April 16, 2003. The Union proved that it is not going to leave anything up to 
chance with it incorporation of protective clauses which were one of the subjects 
of debate during negotiations on the accession of candidate countries. With 
these clauses the EU protects itself in cases of unexpected developments during 
the first three years after enlargement. This concerns protective measures 
related to economic, budgetary and structural polices in the acceding countries, 
which may harm the existing coordinated process of economic policy. 
As far as Cyprus is concerned, the European Council expressed an earnest wish 
to admit a united and not a divided Cyprus to the Union. Therefore, in the 
Presidential Statement from Copenhagen, support was given to the 
determination of Cypriot Greeks and Turks to continue negotiations aimed at a 
comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem, setting February 28, 2003, as a 
deadline. All conditions of the achieved solution must be incorporated in the 
Accession Contract, in accordance with the foundations of the Union. However, if 
a solution is not found, the enforcement of acquis on the northern part of the 
island would be suspended until the Council decides otherwise. A Commission 
was assigned to find ways to foster economic development in the northern part of 
Cyprus in order to bring it closer to the Union. 
Another important thing is final (although partial) definition of one of the key 
issues, i.e. what funds the Union will allocate for its new members. Allocations by 
the Union for costs resulting from obligations established by certain Union 
policies that will burden new members are now precisely defined (Annex 1 of the 
Presidential Statement from the Copenhagen Summit, December 12 – 13, 2002) 
– EUR 9.9 billion for 2004, EUR 12.6 billion for 2005, EUR 15 billion 2006. EUR 
1.8 billion will be earmarked for agriculture for new members in the period 2004 – 
2006, followed by another EUR 3.7 billion and EUR 4.1 billion. For structural 
activities (projects from structural funds) allocation is defined at EUR 6 billion in 
the first year, and as much as EUR 8.8 billion in 2006. Allocation for internal 
affairs and additional costs that may emerge during the transition period is 
relatively balanced, amounting to EUR 1.4 million for each of the three years 
under consideration. A total of EUR 1.6 billion for the three-year period will be 
allocated for administration. 
Besides financial issues, of special significance is the incorporation of new 
members into the institutional system of the Union, with onus on continued 
efficiency of  operation of those institutions. Institutional solutions geared toward 
enlargement were on the agenda of two inter-governmental Conferences which 
resulted in the revision of basic documents of the Union, first in Amsterdam 
(1997) and then in Nice (2000). According to these Agreements, the composition 
of the European Parliament after enlargement will be the following: Germany – 
99, the United Kingdom, France and Italy – 72, Spain and Poland – 50, the 
Netherlands – 25, Greece, Portugal and Belgium – 22, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary – 20, Sweden – 18, Austria – 17, Denmark, Finland and Slovakia – 13, 
Ireland and Lithuania – 12, Latvia – 8, Slovenia – 7, Luxemburg, Estonia and 
Cyprus – 6, and Malta 5. After the enlargement, ten new Member States will 
have the following votes in the Council: Poland – 27, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary – 12, Slovakia and Lithuania – 7, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus 
– 4, and Malta – 3. This will amount to a total of 345 votes, while a qualified 
majority set at 258 votes. As far as the number of members of the Commission is 
concerned, new members will have one representative in the Commission each, 
until this institution reaches 27 representatives. After that, once this limit is met, 
the number of Commission members will start falling and the system of equal 
rotation between members will be introduced. 
 
Message to Other Candidate Countries 
 
Although the Union has welcomed significant progress in implementation of the 
Association Agreement and implementation of reforms, the decision on 
enlargement disappointed Romania and Bulgaria the most, two countries that are 
left out of the first round of enlargement. It is anticipated that these two countries 
will join the Union in 2007, providing they continue to make progress in meeting 
accession criteria and with continuation of accession negotiations. The main 
requirement regarding these countries is to accelerate preparations, which 
includes realization and implementation of obligations undertaken during 
negotiations (first of all, judicial and administrative reforms), while the Union’s 
assistance primarily refers to considerable increase in financial support for these 
processes. 
Another candidate country that will have to wait a little longer for EU membership 
is Turkey. The European Council praised significant progress made by Turkey 
toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria, putting special emphasis on the set of 
laws and appropriate implementation measures related to key sectors. However, 
the greatest objections refer to political criteria, not only in terms of the legislative 
framework, but also in terms of implementation, especially insisting on reaching 
stability of institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, and human and 
minorities rights. In case of Turkey, the Union was very precise, as it defined that 
if the European Council decides that Turkey meets political criteria for 
membership on the basis of the Commission’s report and recommendations 
during its Summit in December 2004, then negotiations with this country will 
begin. 
As far as the relationship with other interested countries is concerned, in 
particular the Western Balkan countries, on this occasion these countries were 
characterized as “neighbors of an enlarged Union”. The European Council 
underlined the significance of meeting the Copenhagen criteria in relation to 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and 
Albania, as well as its own obligation to foster the efforts of these countries in 
their progress towards the Union. Especially important is the decision for Greece  
to organizes a special Summit of EU members and countries which are part of 
the Stabilization and Association Process on June 21, given that it holds the 
Presidency of the Union in the first half of 2003. It is already clear that this 
conference will be of great importance for all Western Balkan countries which are 
expected to show their readiness for mutual regional cooperation during the 
preparation of this meeting. A proactive approach is especially expected of some 
of these countries: the Republic of Croatia which applies for membership in 
February, as well as the state union Serbia and Montenegro, as this conference 
could be the beginning of negotiations for the conclusion of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement with the EU. This will actually be the beginning of a new 
negotiations process for the next enlargement of membership of the European 
Union. 
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THE SECOND REPORT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
“THE WESTERN BALKANS IN TRANSITION” 
 
 
In the late 2002, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs – Directorate for International Relations, released the 
second report on the region of the Western Balkans titled “The Western Balkans 
in Transition”1. 
The Report comprises three units: 
• Survey of macroeconomic trends in the region as a whole and of relations 
with the European Union 
• Fiscal consolidation of the region 
• Country notes which address economic trends, structural reforms and 
international relations. 
In this brief overview of the Report, we will concentrate on economic trends in the 
region as a whole (the first part of the Report) and actual assessment of reforms 
and the economic situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the third part 
of the Report). 
 
Main Economic Trends in the Western Balkans  
 
At the beginning of the Report, it is stressed that the Western Balkan region is 
composed of relatively small sized economies. While the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia has the largest population (8.6 million), in economic terms Croatia is 
strongest with a GDP of over € 22 billion. The population of the whole region is 
almost 25 million people, equivalent to 6.5% of the population of the EU. The 
GDP of the whole region amounts to € 50 billion, which is equivalent to as little as 
0.6% of the EU’s GDP, or 40% of Portugal’s GDP. The GDP per capita at current 
nominal exchange rates in the region as a whole averages about € 1.800 with a 
great difference between particular countries. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The first report “The Western Balkans in Transition” (2001) can be found on 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/supplement_c_en.htm 
The Western Balkans – Macroeconomic Trends, 1998 - 20022 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002p
Real GDP growth1 % 3.8 -3.2 4.5 4 3.8
Inflation1 % 15.7 16.4 36.4 12 6.1
Exports2 Million € 8801 7776 9729 10320 na
Imports2 Million € 16690 15036 18423 21461 na
Trade balance with the 
 EU2 Million € -4426 -4205 -5061 -6721 na
FDI 
Million € 1138 1618 1713 2542 2111
         p Projections. 1 Weighted average. 2 Excluding Kosovo and Metohija 
 
 
Following the recovery in 2000 from the 1999 Kosovo crisis, the Western Balkan 
region continued to register a rise in real GDP by 4% in 2001, despite the 
slowdown in the world economy. However, there are significant differences 
among particular countries in terms of achieved GDP growth rates in 2001, which 
is indicated in the following table. Stability in the region and reforms in all the 
states are estimated as contributing to the continuation of positive economic 
performances of the region as a whole, and to the realization of the real GDP 
growth rate of nearly 4% in 2002.  
 
Country Summary – Macroeconomic Indicators 2001-20023 
Population1 GDP p.c. Real GDP growth Inflation Trade balance Current account
2 FDI3 Country 
million In € % % % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP
  2001 2001 2001 2002p 2001 2002p 2001 2002p 2001 2002p 2001 2002p
Albania 3.4 1350 6.5 5 3.5 3.9 -25 -22.1 -6.3 -5.9 5 5.8 
B&H 4.3 1175 2.3 2.5 3.3 2.3 -36.9 -33.5 -22.3 -20.7 2.9 5 
Croatia 4.4 5140 3.8 4 2.6 3 -21 -21.5 -3.1 -3.6 6.5 4.9 
FRY 8.6 1412 5.5 4 39 15 -26 -25.8 -5.5 -8.2 1.5 4.4 
Kosovo (FRY) 2 941 11 7 11.3 6.5 -47.3 -50.2 9.1 -2 0.3 0.5 
Macedonia 2 1885 -4.1 0.5 3.7 3 -11.7 -11.4 -10.6 -9.7 13.2 2 
The Western Balkans 24.7 2026 4.1 3.8 12 6.1 -24.4 -24.1 -6 -7.1 5.3 4.5 
p Projection. 1 Population. 2 Including official transfers. 3 Foreign direct investments. 
 
Significant progress has been made in reducing inflation. Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia have consistently maintained one-digit 
inflation rates over the past four years, registering an average rate of 2.9% at the 
end of 2001. A two-digit inflation rate in the region as a whole at the end of 2001 
was mainly due to a high inflation rate in Kosovo, and especially the 39% inflation 
rate in our country (resulting from liberalization of prices in 2001), which is, again, 
much lower than the 113% inflation rate registered in the late 2000. With a further 
                                                 
2 Source: “The Western Balkans in Transition”, European Commission, Directorate – General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, pp. 1, 
http://euroea.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/westernbalkans_en.htm 
3 Ibidem, pp.2 
inflation drop in our country, inflation in the region as a whole should decline, 
thus reaching for the first time since 1997 a single digit rate. 
Western Balkan countries showed large fiscal deficits in 2001, with the exception 
of Yugoslavia, which recorded, before grants, a fiscal deficit of 1.3% of the GDP, 
and Kosovo, which showed a surplus of 1.3%, excluding capital expenditures. In 
other countries of the region, general government deficits as a ratio to GDP 
averaged more than 6%. Fiscal deficits are expected to improve in 2002 with the 
exception of FRY, including Kosovo. 
In 2001 international trade for the region as a whole was not affected by the 
global downturn. Although both exports and imports registered upward trends, 
import growth has outpaced export growth, resulting in the worsening of trade 
balances in the region. Trade deficits as a ratio to GDP were significantly larger, 
ranging from almost 12% in Macedonia to 47% in Kosovo. However, increasing 
trade deficits are not necessarily a negative evolution, especially when they are 
linked to economic growth and a need for imports in order to satisfy growing 
investment needs, and/or when they are compensated by surpluses in the 
balance of services. The introduction by the EU of unilateral trade measures, 
granting free access to the EU market, represents an important prerequisite for 
the development of the export sector in the region. In 2001, the share of trade 
with the European Union in total trade accounted for slightly over 50%, ranging 
from around 80% in Albania, to more than 40% in our country. 
As far as the current account is concerned, it is slightly better than the trade 
balance, thanks to significant private remittances, positive balances of services 
and official transfers (especially large in FRY, including Kosovo). The current 
account is expected to worsen in the two largest economies (Croatia and FRY), 
leading to an increase in the average current account deficit for the region as a 
whole.  
Foreign direct investments in the region doubled since 1998, reaching € 2.5 
billion in 2001, which corresponds to more than 5% of the Western Balkan GDP. 
This figure is even higher than the same ratio in the eight Central and Eastern 
European countries (4.8%) which are candidates to EU accession in 2004. This 
result may be partly explained by the lower level of GDP in the Western Balkans 
with respect to CEE. In fact, in per capita terms: 2001 FDI inflows in the region 
were equivalent to € 100, a level that is significantly lower with respect to the 
benchmark of  CEE acceding countries (€ 250). In 2001, the largest inflows of 
FDI’s were directed towards Macedonia and Croatia. The main inflows of FDI’s 
are related to privatization in the countries in the region. FDI flows as a percent of 
the GDP are expected to stabilize and to increase in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the FRY, and to decrease significantly in Macedonia. 
At the end of this part of the Report, an emphasis was put on positive 
developments realized thus far, and on challenges lying ahead of the Western 
Balkan countries.  
Political and institutional developments are stressed as groundwork for attracting 
foreign capital in the region. The progressive restoration of peace and stability, 
and the perspective of integration of the region into the European Union through 
the Stabilization and Association process have considerably improved the 
political outlook in the region. Moreover, Western Balkan countries made 
progress in reforming their economies, in particular in the area of SME, 
privatization and trade liberalization (establishment of the Balkans free trade 
area). The reform of the banking sector has also advanced. Croatia and 
Macedonia have practically completed privatization of that sector, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina has privatized major banks, while our country has made 
considerable improvements in restructuring and cleaning up the banking sector.  
These positive steps need to be followed by other reforms, namely the full 
respect of the rule of law, accompanied by the fight against corruption, 
transparency of the legal framework, creation of efficient infrastructures and, 
more generally, establishment of a business-friendly economic environment. 
Along these necessary reforms, the Western Balkan countries are expected to 
continue the transition towards functional market economies, through the 
implementation of important structural reforms, namely the completion of the 
process of privatization, the creation of efficient financial markets (which in many 
countries of the region are still at the embryonic stage), and reform of the public 
sector and establishment of a central treasury system.  
 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
 
As far as macroeconomic indicators are concerned, economic growth in 2001 
was higher than projected, and was mainly driven by the recovery of agricultural 
output in FRY and increased activity in services. According to the Report, 
industrial production in the FRY in 2002 is expected to increase by 2-3%, with the 
economic growth rate reaching 4%, mainly on the basis of estimated increase in 
services, while agricultural production is expected to remain at the 2001 level. 
In the eight months to August 2002, retail prices both in Serbia and Montenegro 
increased by about 9%, and therefore the estimated annual inflation rate was 
revised downward from 20% to 15% in Serbia, i.e. from 15% to 10% in 
Montenegro. The inflation drop in 2001 and 2002 was largely contributed to by a 
restrictive and a stability-oriented monetary policy of the central bank, and by 
wage constraints in the public sector. 
The FRY general government deficit (including Montenegro’s deficit) in 2001 was 
considerably lower than projected (1.4% of GDP compared to projected 6.1%), 
amounting to approximately €157 million. This was in part due to a tax policy 
implemented in the first half of 2001 and the improvement in the collection of tax 
revenues, but primarily to significant reduction of budgetary expenditures. The 
deficit was financed through domestic borrowings (0.6% of GDP) and foreign 
financing (0.8% of GDP as compared to the programmed 4.1%). According to the 
Report, the budget deficit increase in 2002 is projected at 5.7% of the GDP. This 
deficit is planned to be financed through domestic borrowings (0.5% of GDP), 
privatization income (1.3% of GDP) and foreign financing (4% of GDP). 
 
FRY - Main Economic Trends, 1999-20024 
  1999 2000 2001 2002p
                                                 
4 Ibidem, pp. 38. 
Real GDP growth % -18 5 5.5 4
% (average) 42 73 91 20Inflation rate 
  % (end of period) 50 113 39 15
Unemployment % of labor force 27 27 28 29
General government balance1 % of GDP NA -0.9 -1.4 -5
Trade balance % of GDP -15.9 -22.3 -26 -25.8
Current account balance1 % of GDP -7.5 -7.6 -10.9 -11.7
External debt  € billion 8.9 12.2 13.5 8.7
Debt-to-export ratio  % NA 453 429 273
% of GDP 0.9 0.3 1.5 4.4FDI 
€ billion 105 27 184 570
        p Projection. 1 Before foreign donations.  
 
As far as external situation of FRY is concerned, the current account deficit in 
2001 was lower than projected (10.9% instead of 14.6% of GDP), although 
imports grew more than expected and exports were slightly below the projected 
amount.  This improvement was due to higher than expected inflows of 
remittances from abroad (€ 1,400 million instead of an estimated € 1,000 million). 
In the first nine months of 2002, the FRY registered a higher than projected trade 
deficit, in spite of a large 20% increase in exports compared to the same period 
in 2001. However, imports increased by 25% in that period mainly as a result of 
strong domestic demand for consumer products and investments. The current 
account deficit which has been projected at 12.8% in 2002 by the International 
Monetary Fund program is now projected to reach 11.7% of the GDP as a net 
inflow from remittances, with money from abroad continuing to exceed the 
projected level. 
In the forthcoming period, debt servicing (interests payments and the need to 
further strengthening national foreign exchange reserves) will continue to put a 
heavy strain on the balance of payments in our country. The IMF foresees further 
slight reduction of the current account deficit in 2003 from 11.7% to 10.9% of 
GDP, debt amortization payments of around US$ 50 million, further increase in 
gross foreign exchange reserves by about US$ 600 million, with official financing 
from abroad in the form of grants and loans expected to amount to US$ 1.3 
billion. 
The Report praised structural reforms that were implemented throughout 2001 
and 2002, especially in the area of expenditure control and tax policy, and the 
cleaning up of the banking system. 
As far as reform in the area of public finance is concerned, important preparatory 
steps has been taken towards establishing the institution of a Treasury while 
public expenditures control has been improved considerably. The institution of a 
Treasury is expected to become fully operational in the spring of 2003. 
The process of privatization in Serbia which is carried out through tenders and 
auctions has gained some momentum since early 2002. Total proceeds from 
privatization in the first ten months of 2002 exceeded the targeted amount (€ 270 
million compared to € 130 million). In order to facilitate the privatization of less 
profitable companies in Serbia through international tenders, the authorities plan 
to amend the Privatization Law, especially the provisions concerning obligatory 
post-privatization employment protection (from the present five years to one 
year). 
As regards financial sector reform, the achievements of the National Bank of 
Yugoslavia are praised in strengthening banking supervision. It is also stressed 
that after the Constitutional Charter goes into force, the NBY will cease to exist 
and its functions will be taken over by two central banks at the level of the 
republics. 
The Report also stresses that further steps which are planned in the 
reconstruction of the state administration and the real sector seem encouraging. 
In the area of international relations, the Report stresses that after political and 
democratic changes in October 2000, FRY authorities have made considerable 
progress in establishing links with international organizations, and in particular in 
normalizing the country’s financial relations with multilateral and bilateral 
creditors. The IMF Extended Agreement for 2002 – 2005 of about US$ 860 
million was adopted in May 2002; furthermore, in March 2002, the World Bank 
disbursed a first Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC).   
As far as relations with the European Union are concerned, general Community 
support was provided under the CARDS program (€ 630 million in 2001 – 2002 to 
support, among other things, institution building in the public administration and 
sector reforms in energy and transport); furthermore, the Community supported 
the process of economic reforms in the FRY through the provision of 
macrofinancial assistance of € 345 million, of which € 120 million were in the form 
of grants. 
As regards the Stabilization and Association process, considerable progress has 
been made. The Consultative Working Group of the EC and the FRY met five 
times, with the next step in the process being the preparation by the Commission 
of a Feasibility Study on the feasibility of embarking upon negotiations on a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement. However, timing depends on progress 
with the implementation of reforms, but also on the finalization and adoption of 
the new Constitutional Charter and implementation of an Internal Market Action 
Plan. 
 
Source: “Midday Express”, http://europa.eu.int/comm/press_room/index_en.htm 
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Macroeconomic Trends in 2002 and Forecasts for the First Six Months of 2003 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MACROECONOMIC TRENDS IN 2002 
 
 
General Overview 
 
Gross national income is estimated to have increased by 4% in real terms in 
2002, year-to-year, which corresponds to the forecast we made in July last year. 
The most important factors that affected GDP growth are the following: (1) 
significant slowdown in inflation, compared with last year; (2) stability of domestic 
currency; (3) faster inflow of foreign capital from international financial 
institutions, in the form of credit arrangements and from direct foreign 
investments in privatization; (4) increase in domestic savings, and (5) imports. 
The total employment in the formal sector is slightly lower, compared to previous 
year, which indicates improvement in the quality of development due to improved 
productivity and efficiency of investments.  
The 2002 import growth of 20.6% is considerably above the expected. Coupled 
with dynamics of exports, which were also beyond expectations, the result is a 
trade deficit.    
The overall standard of living of citizens significantly improved owing to the 
increase in the population’s income in real terms (the average wage in 2002 rose 
by 30.2% in real terms, year-to-year). High real growth of the average wage 
implies relatively high growth in the average pension and social benefits. 
Realized dynamics of economic growth according to economic activities indicates 
that a very high level of domestic demand, despite being boosted to a greater 
extent by foreign donations than by domestic economy, affected a pick-up in 
construction, retail trade and transport, while industrial production growth was 
much slower and slightly below expectations.   
Reform of the banking sector and the sector of public finance developed 
according to expectations. The results of these reforms are reflected in much 
stronger macroeconomic stability than the expected. However, structural reforms 
in the economy have been lagging behind significantly in terms of the 
restructuring and privatization of socially-owned enterprises, and the 
restructuring of public (state-owned) enterprises. Hence, the effects of 
macroeconomic stabilization are relatively modest in terms of gross national 
income growth, while they are fully effective in terms of real growth in the 
citizens’ standard of living, and increasingly stimulate domestic savings. 
Everything put forth thus far indicates that the Government of Serbia will have to 
accelerate reforms in the real sector so as to permit full positive effect of 
macroeconomic stabilization on domestic gross income growth, coordination 
between trends of domestic supply and demand, and on further increase of 
exports. 
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Production and Services 
 
Industrial production in Serbia in 2002 registered 1.7% growth, which is slightly 
under the 2% forecasted by the G 17 Institute in the July Macroeconomic 
Forecasts. Industrial output rose by 1.6% in Central Serbia and by 2.1% in 
Vojvodina. With regard to the sectors of industrial production, the highest growth 
was registered in manufacturing (2.7%); as far as mining and quarrying are 
concerned, this sector displayed considerably lower growth (by 1%), while water, 
electricity and gas production and supply dropped by 1.7% year-to-year. By 
destination of consumptions, the production of capital goods was up by as much 
as 14.1%, the production of intermediate goods grew by 2.7%, while the 
production of consumer goods was down by 0.7%.  
According to the figures for the first eleven months, the value of realized 
construction work is estimated to be up by 35.8% in real terms, compared with 
last year. Very dynamic growth in the real value of realized construction work, 
which, in our assessment, largely resulted from increase in real domestic 
demand throughout 2002, has had and will have a manifold effect on other 
economic activities in 2003. Also, as the real estate demand curve, which in our 
country primarily relates to flats and commercial space, is subject to interest 
rates, we expect increase in demand for these goods to follow the announced 
reduction of interest rates next year, which will have further positive impact on 
the pick-up in construction activity.  
Freight transport recorded strong development in 2003, while passenger 
transport, except for air transport, dropped off (measured in ton kilometers). 
Growth of transport volume in 2002 is estimated at about 8%. 
Retail trade turnover in 2002 increased by 10.5%, and wholesale turnover 
dropped by 4.6% in real terms year-to-year. Real growth in overall turnover in 
trade in 2002 is estimated at 8.5%, compared with the previous year’s period.  
According to the 10-month performance in tourism and the hotel and restaurant 
industry, these two activities are estimated to have fallen by 0.6%. 
 
Labor Market 
 
Total employment in Serbia in 2002 dropped by 1.7%, year-to-year, as a result of 
the significant decrease of 6.1% in the number of employees in the socially-
owned sector. Since the data on employment in the private sector and small-
sized enterprises is released in March and September every year, the annual 
average on the basis of these two totals indicates that the number of the 
employed in the private sector increased by 11.6% and in small-sized enterprises 
by 10.0%. According to the data of the Serbian Labor Market Bureau, total 
registered unemployment in Serbia stood at 904,494 in December 2002, a 15.9% 
year-to-year increase, while the average number of the unemployed in the period 
January – December 2002 increased by 9.6%. The registered unemployment 
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rate in 2002 was 28.2%, which is up by 2.2 percentage points compared with the 
unemployment rate registered in 2001.  
The number of job openings decreased by 14.4%, and the number of new jobs 
dropped by 1.9%. More job openings were filled by permanent employment in 
2002 (83.2%), as compared to last year (72.6%). As expected, the share of 
fluctuation in total employment increased, which is in line with the experience of 
other countries in transition, with fluctuation in 2002 being 38.6%, compared to 
29.3% in 2001. 
The number of terminations in 2002 increased by 14.9% year-to-year. 
According to the latest data for October 2002, the total number of unemployment 
benefits recipients amounted to 78,695, out of whom 44,896 are registered as 
redundancies, and 25,004 on the basis of bankruptcy. The total number of 
unemployment benefits recipients rose by 32.3% on average in the period 
January – October 2002, compared with the previous year’s period - the number 
of unemployment benefit recipients on the basis of redundant labor was up by 
32.3%, and on the basis of bankruptcy, by 47.7%. 
 
Features of Domestic Demand 
 
On the basis of developments in retail trade, real growth in personal consumption 
is estimated at 10%, which is twice as high as the development in domestic 
supply, i.e. GDP. Domestic demand was met to a significant extent through 
import; the highest rates of growth were recorded in imports of machinery and 
finished products. A portion of the population’s income is estimated to have been 
put aside for savings. 
The average gross wage in December 2002 was YuD 16,643, while the nominal 
net wage was YuD 11,555, a rise of 12.3% month-on-month, or of 36.6% 
compared with December 2001. Consumer prices in December 2002 remained 
at the previous month’s level; thus, real growth in the average net wage was 
equal to nominal growth (12.3%). Real growth in the average wage in December 
2002 year-to-year was 22.2%. 
The average net wage in Serbia in 2002 was YuD 9,232, an increase of 51.8% in 
nominal terms, compared with last year. Given consumer price inflation of 16.6% 
in the period under consideration, the average wage in 2002 increased by 30.2 % 
in real terms, year-to-year. Such dynamics of growth in wages, coupled with 
considerable deceleration in the growth of food prices, resulted in the expected 
balance of the value of the statistical consumer’s basket and the average net 
wage at the end of 2002. 
The lowest wages are still paid out in the manufacturing of textile and textile 
products. Wages in this sector were lower by about 63-73%, compared with the 
average wage at the level of the Republic. This indicates that the Government 
needs to reconsider and amend laws and regulations which might be to blame for 
the unfavorable economic position of this industry. 
Bearing in mind the realized dynamics of the average real wage, and given the 
fact that it participates with 50% in the adjustment of pension trends, we might 
say that the average pension paid out by the Old Age Pension and Disability 
Fund of the Employed in 2002 apparently rose in real terms. Since we do not 
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have comparable data on the nominal pensions paid out in 2001, due to the 
change in coverage of beneficiaries in 2002 relative to 2001, we are not in a 
position to present precise and accurate data on real growth in the average 
pension. However, our estimation of real increase in the average pension is 
confirmed by the fact that in January 2002 it took 45% of the average pension to 
cover the value of the statistical consumer’s basket for one family member, while, 
in December 2002, this share dropped to 40%. 
Both the Old Age Pension and Disability Fund of Farmers and the Old Age 
Pension and Disability Fund of the Self-employed were paying out pensions to 
their beneficiaries on a regular basis throughout 2002. The Old Age Pension and 
Disability Fund of the Self-employed paid out 12 pensions to December 2002 
inclusive, while the Old Age Pension and Disability Fund of Farmers paid out 
12.5 out of the planned 15 pensions. This Fund still has significant delay in 
payments since the pension paid out in December refers to the first half of the 
September 2001 pension. 
 
Foreign Trade 
 
Import and export growth in Serbia in 2002 went far beyond initial expectations. 
Commodity exports rose by 20.6% and commodity imports by 31.8%, which is 
considerably above the projections of both the Federal Government and the IMF, 
which ranged between 12-14% for exports, and 9-15% for imports. Such a high 
import growth significantly widened the trade deficit, which, at the level of Serbia, 
was up by as much as 1 US$ billion, compared with 2001. 
According to economic-end use, imports of machinery and finished products, 
which account for 1/5 in the total imports at present, recorded the highest rates of 
growth. This trend suggests the process of replacement of obsolete equipment in 
domestic enterprises, as well as an increased demand for foreign durable 
consumer goods. Domestic producers of consumer goods are obviously not yet 
competitive enough on the domestic market, and it is unlikely they will be able to 
improve markedly their exporting performance before the consolidation of their 
position in relation to the competition. 
The current-account deficit was also wider than projected, reaching US$ 1.7 
billion. This is primarily due to unexpectedly high growth of commodity imports, 
as well as to the fact that the surplus on the part of non-commodity current 
transactions was slightly lower than last year. The highest surplus was recorded 
in current transfers (primarily owing to the purchase of foreign currency) and 
donations, while the surplus on the part of services was lower than projected, 
being even lower than the surplus recorded in 2001. 
 
Privatization and Restructuring of the Economy 
 
The results of privatization are rather poor. In 2002, only 12 enterprises were 
sold by tender and about 140 by public auction. This is considerably lower than 
the number of companies initially scheduled for privatization, i.e. 80 enterprises 
by tender and 1,000 by auction. Moreover, this is a very modest result 
considering the total number of enterprises which are due to undergo 
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privatization (about 4,000). In our assessment, this is the basic reason for the 
poor performance of the industry in Serbia. The slow pace and poor results of the 
privatization carried out so far also have a negative impact on the interest of 
strategic partners in the purchase of large enterprises, and these enterprises to 
the greatest extent generate negative effects on economic growth and 
development. 
Auction sales are transparent enough, which could not be said for tenders. The 
present method of selecting the best offer involves as many as four criteria 
(price, investments, social program and the program of environmental 
protection), and for each of them there is a certain weight. After a successful 
tender sale, the data on other offerers is not publicly presented, which raises the 
question of transparency of tender sale methodology, and whether discretion in 
selection may appear as a source of corruption. All four criteria are very 
important and respond to the domestic situation and needs, which makes tender 
privatization acceptable, both from the position of enterprises and from the 
overall social position. However, although the issues of social programs and the 
program of environmental protection are of extreme importance, it must be 
clearly distinguished which portion of costs of these programs should be borne 
by the buyer, and which rests with the state given the existing unfavorable 
situation in both segments. 
The process of restructuring large-sized, socially-owned enterprises is also 
behind schedule, while the restructuring of public enterprise has not even started 
yet. Continued reduction of inflation could be jeopardized if plans for increase in 
the prices of electric power, public and other utilities proceed without being 
accompanied by the restructuring of public enterprises, which are well-known for 
their irrational performance and huge unnecessary expenditures. 
The Government must be ready and determined in resolving these issues, which 
are, ultimately, of crucial importance for the continuation of overall reforms. 
 
Cooperation with International Financial Organizations 
 
Tardiness in the adoption of the Constitutional Charter resulted in the 
postponement of the issuance of the third installment of the Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF), granted by the International Monetary Fund for the purpose of 
overcoming problems in the balance of payments and stabilization of the dinar. 
This credit of about US$ 830 million was approved in May 2002, when its first 
installment was released, while the second installment was drawn in August. 
Since the Constitutional Charter has been adopted recently, the third installment 
is scheduled for released during the first quarter of 2003, and it is worthwhile 
hoping that any new political obstacles will not disturb the expected dynamics of 
cooperation with the IMF. 
Cooperation with the World Bank is primarily directed toward institutional 
capacity-building and the preparation of a strategy for combating poverty in 
Serbia. During last year several credits were approved under IDA conditions 
(twenty-year maturity and ten-year grace period), in the total amount of nearly 
US$ 200 million. These are the Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC), the Private 
and Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (PFSAC), credits for improvement of 
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education and for trade and transport facilitation, aid for financing of export and a 
credit for technical assistance in the privatization and restructuring of banks and 
enterprises. In the first six months of 2003 we should expect the release of the 
Social Sector Adjustment Credit (SOSAC), another PFSAC, credits for promotion 
of public finance management, for public health investments, as well as Labor 
Learning and Innovation Credit (LIC). 
 
Free Trade Agreements 
 
The establishment of the Southeast Europe Free Trade Agreement is scheduled 
for promotion in the middle of this year. So far our country has signed free trade 
agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Croatia, while during 
the first quarter of 2003 free trade agreements are to be signed with Albania and 
Romania. 
As far as the countries outside of Southeast Europe are concerned, free trade 
agreements with Russia and Hungary are effective (ratified last year), while the 
agreement with Slovenia, which was scheduled for signing by the end of 2002, 
has been postponed and it is still uncertain when this agreement is going to be 
signed.  
However, due to the inexistence of a common foreign trade regime within the 
federation, and in particular owing to the announcement that Montenegro is not 
going to enforce agreements concluded so far, problems in implementation are 
likely to appear.  
 
Exchange Rate and Foreign Currency Reserves 
 
The result of the adoption of regulations which liberalized operations on the 
foreign currency exchange market at the beginning of last year is that in May 
2002 the International Monetary Fund recognized convertibility of the dinar in 
current foreign transactions. 
Throughout the year, the exchange rate was showing slight nominal depreciation 
(which started to accelerate slowly by the end of the year) and appreciation in 
real terms, which was, however, less dynamic than in 2001. 
The first six months of 2002 on the foreign exchange market were marked by the 
conversion of European currencies into the euro. Thus the process of re-
monetization of economic activity, initiated in 2001, continued, while the 
conversion significantly contributed to dynamic increase of the country’s foreign 
exchange reserves. The level of foreign exchange reserves at the National Bank 
of Yugoslavia at the end of 2002 reached nearly US$ 2.3 billion, which covers 
five-month imports (the average commodity imports of FRY in 2002), a nearly 
100% year-to-year increase. The most important factors contributing to this 
growth, besides the inflow of foreign exchange through exchange operations, 
were credits and donations from foreign countries. In this year we may expect 
reduced inflow on the basis of exchange operations, as well as increased 
outflows. 
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Foreign Direct Investments 
 
The level of foreign direct investments in the FRY significantly increased, as 
compared with 2001, reaching US$ 475 million. The portion of FDIs that entered 
the country through the privatization process primarily relates to tender 
privatization (above all, three cement factories sold at the end of the year 2001, 
but the sale was realized at the beginning of 2002), and to the sale of shares 
from the Action Fund’s portfolio, whereas foreign investors were not very 
interested in auction sales of enterprises. Greenfield investments have also 
started, the most important ones being linked to retail trade. Following the 
removal of political uncertainty associated with the framework of the future 
federal state, with the further reform of institutions and removal of administrative 
barriers, completion of a legislative framework, as well as with the speeding up of 
the privatization process, more dynamic inflow of foreign direct investments can 
be expected already during this year. 
 
Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
 
Money supply (M1) in December 2002 was YuD 116.4 billion, which is up 
nominally by 91.3%, or by 66.7%, in real terms, year-to-year. However, if 
deflationed by the retail prices index, then M1 increased by 66.6%. 
The share of cash money supply in M1 had a downward trend, standing at 32.5% 
in December. 
In order to regulate the amount of money in circulation, in 2002 the NBY issued 
treasury bills in the amount of YuD 74.95 billion. Out of the total value issued, 
62.2% of the treasury bills, i.e. YuD 46.62, billion were sold. 
A trend of a further cut in interest rates continued in 2002. The weighted average 
of interest rates on commercial and treasury bills and certificates of deposit at a 
monthly level in January 2002 was 3.71%, and in the last quarter of the year it 
did not go beyond the level of 2.50% per month. In December, the average 
weighted interest rate on short-term securities was 2.40%, at a monthly level. 
The NBY’s discount rate at the beginning of 2002 was 16.43% at an annual level, 
dropping to 9.50% during the first six months, where it held steady throughout the 
second half of the year. 
The average interest rate on the NBY’s treasury bills (for all issuings from April 1 
through December 31) is 11.60% at an annual level. Subscription of NBY bills 
with a 15-day maturity is no longer available as of May, while bills with 90-day 
maturity were introduced. Treasury bills with 180-day maturity appeared at the 
Belgrade Stock Exchange in the mid-July 2002. 
Year 2002 began with a huge structural change in the banking sector. A ruling on 
the bankruptcy of the Beogradska banka, Beobanka, Investbanka and 
Jugobanka was issued on January 3 (the sanation costs of these four banks are 
estimated at over EUR 4 billion, which is an economically unacceptable amount). 
Negotiations with the IMF in March of 2002 resulted in a three-year financial 
arrangement in the value of US$ 800 million. On May 15, 2002, having fulfilled all 
obligations under Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the Yugoslav 
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dinar became convertible for all current foreign transaction for the first time since 
1946. 
Public confidence in the banking system significantly increased and both dinar 
and foreign deposits rose considerably. By December 31, 2002, inclusive, total 
savings in banks reached an equivalent of US$ 851.470 million, of which US$ 
791.265 million refer to foreign exchange deposits and US$ 60.205 million to 
dinar deposits. Leading banks in terms of the level of total savings are 
Komercijalna banka, Reiffeisen bank Yugoslavia, Vojvodjanska banka, Societe 
Generale Yugoslavia and Delta banka. 
Gross collection of public revenues in 2002 was YuD 435.85 billion, which is 
nominally up by 61.72% year-to-year. In real terms, fiscal revenues rose by 
35.33%, compared with last year. The revenues of budget and other users in the 
total public revenues of the Republic of Serbia in 2002 account for 56.5%, a 
34.25% increase in December 2002, year-to-year. Health insurance revenues 
also rose by 49.9% over the same period. Fiscal revenues have recorded two 
years of continuous growth in real terms (deflated by retail prices growth), which 
may be illustrated with information that public revenues collection in the last six 
months of 2002 is equivalent in real terms to the amount collected during eleven 
months of 2000. 
 
Social Insurance 
 
At the beginning of 2002 the new Law on Old-Age Pension and Disability 
Insurance, adopted at the federal level a year before, went into effect. A new 
method of indexing of pensions was introduced - instead of the formerly applied 
indexation in line with trends in wages, as of January, a combined indexation 
according to trends in wages and the consumer price index (50%:50%) has been 
applied. This Law extended the retirement age for both men and women: men 
retire at the age of 63, and women at the age of 58. 
The Draft Law on Pension and Disability Insurance in Serbia was adopted at the 
end of December 2002. This Law introduces a new method for pension 
calculation according to the formula which adjusts a pension to the value of 
contributed premiums and the length of pension tenure. 
As far as public health is concerned, a strategy for the implementation of reforms 
in this area is in preparation. Old laws which favor a centralized system of 
management and administration of healthcare institutions are still in force. The 
Ministry in charge of public health assigns and releases directors, deputy 
directors and members of management and supervisory boards of all public 
health institutions founded by the Republic of Serbia, while in health care 
institutions dealing with educational activities and scientific research, these 
officials are assigned and released by the Government of the Republic of Serbia. 
Decentralization of the management of the healthcare system is necessary and 
we expect appropriate changes of regulations in that respect. 
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Social Policy 
 
The Government of the Republic of Serbia prepared a starting framework for the 
reduction of poverty which is supported by the World Bank. This strategy is to be 
adopted by mid-2003. The concept of the strategy is based on active measures 
which would stimulate the development of the domestic economy, thus affecting 
reduction of poverty, as the poorest families are mostly those with unemployed 
members. This includes: 
• Giving high priority to the restructuring of the economy and the creation of 
new jobs 
• Creating new employment and income opportunities 
• Widening the network of SMEs  
• Developing new products and services. 
Another important law adopted last year is the Law on Family Cash Benefits. 
 
 
Forecasts of Macroeconomic Trends in the First Six Months of 2003 
 
 
We forecast developments of 17 selected macroeconomic variables for the 
period of the next six months. In modeling the observed variables we used two 
groups of models: univariant time series and structural error-correction models. 
Forecasts are made on the basis of the results of assessment of specified 
models. Basic links between the observed variables are defined in the G17 
Institute Economic Review No. 30. In modeling the subsets of variables we relied 
on the results of outcomes of appropriate tests. We tested all the analyzed time 
series for stationarity. 
For the majority of time series, the starting point of observation is assigned to 
July 1999. The latest available data in analyzing nearly all time series relates to 
December 2002. As the forecast values are obtained by including the dynamics 
of analyzed time-series, as well as of those measurable variables which are 
relevant for the explanation of the given time-series, the forecasts will give 
satisfactory values, unless institutional changes affect developments of analyzed 
variables. 
 
Prices and Wages 
 
Inflation in June 2003 compared with December 2002 is projected at about 5.1%, 
while the cumulative rate of retail prices, measured by the ratio of their growth in 
the first six months to the last year’s average, is forecast at about 10.6%. The 
obtained growth rate of prices does not comprise increase in electricity prices. If 
increase in the price of electricity announced for April is included, we may expect 
about a 10% inflation rate already in June (compared to December 2002), which 
will be higher than the inflation registered in June 2002, and will also exceed the 
inflation projected for the whole year. This suggests that increase in the electricity 
price projected for April should be postponed to follow the restructuring of the 
EPS, which would, in our assessment, result in significant rationalization. In that 
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context, the issue of the increase of the price of electricity should be 
reconsidered later. Forecasted values in the chart reflect trends in the retail price 
index without the impact of electricity price growth. 
 
 
 
In the course of the first six months of 2003, we expect the dynamics of growth in 
the average net wage to slowdown. In June 2003, relative to December 2002, the 
growth in the average nominal net wage is estimated at 8.4%, while the growth of 
the real wage is forecast at about 3.1%. The expected real growth of the average 
wage is based on the projected inflation for the first six months. 
Forecasted values of the average nominal net wage are obtained by modeling 
the average wage, retail prices and the nominal exchange rate. Prices and 
wages are adjusted to the assessed long-run relationship formed by wages, 
prices and nominal exchange rate. The inclusion of assessed long-run 
relationship in the exchange rate equation does not contribute to the explanation 
of its developments. The assessed value of coefficients suggests further 
weakening of the impact of the exchange rate on the dynamics of growth in 
average wages over the forecast period. 
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Production and Services 
 
The realized industrial production growth rate of 1.7% at the end of 2002 
indicates the beginning of its recovery. Forecasted values of industrial production 
in the next six months indicate that this process is likely to continue throughout 
the year, as well. The ratio of the forecasted cumulative growth rate in the first six 
months of 2003 to cumulative growth rate achieved in the same period last year 
implies growth of 0.6%. 
Forecast values of agricultural production, which are approximated by the time 
series which reflects the dynamics of authorized purchase of agricultural 
products, indicates the likeliness of attaining a positive growth rate in the first six 
months of 2003. Namely, in the course of last year, the value of authorized 
purchase of agricultural products was down by 6%, compared to 2001, and in the 
first six months of this year, the value of authorized purchase is estimated to 
increase by about 11.7%, year-to-year. 
In 2002, a significant pick-up was recorded in the value of realized construction 
work due to the increase in work productivity in the construction industry. Such a 
dynamics is expected to continue this year. Forecasted values of construction 
works, expressed as the ratio of cumulative values in the first six months of this 
year to the values realized in the same period last year, yield a growth of about 
44%. In the interpretation of these results it is important to stress that they are 
exclusively based on available data for the socially-owned sector of the 
construction industry. 
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The volume of activities in tourism was assessed by analyzing the series of the 
number of tourist nights realized in Serbia. While activities in tourism declined in 
2002, year-to-year, the total number of tourist nights in the first six months of 
2003 is forecast to rise by 0.5%, compared with the performance in the same 
period last year.  
Retail trade recorded a significant increase in turnover during the last two years. 
The forecast for the following six months is made by assessing the nominal value 
of realized retail trade turnover in relation to the average nominal net wage and 
achieved industrial output. The obtained assessment of parameters indicates that 
   14
the dynamics of turnover in trade are to a great extent explained by the 
mentioned factors. Forecasted values for the next six months indicate possible 
increase in the volume of retail trade turnover by about 18.2% relative to the total 
value realized in 2002. It is necessary to point to the fact that the available 
database was not complete. As the original data relates to the socially-owned 
sector of trade only, forecasted values are relevant only for socially-owned retail 
trade. 
 
 
Real growth in retail trade turnover in the socially-owned sector in the next six 
months is estimated at about 7.5%, year-to-year. The dynamics of real turnover 
in retail trade is to a great extent explained by trends in the real average net 
wage. Bearing in mind the expectation of considerably lower growth of the 
average net wage, the forecasted increase in retail trade turnover indicates that, 
besides wages and pensions, the development of this variable will be 
significantly affected by other incomes of the population. 
The forecast of trends in passenger and freight transport is made by modeling 
the variables of the total of realized passenger and ton kilometers, and refers to 
the period November 2002 - June 2003. Transport, expressed in ton kilometers, 
rose by 9.5% in the ten months of 2002, compared with the 2001 average, while, 
when expressed in passenger kilometers, it dropped by 4.6%. We forecast an 
increase of 2.1% in freight transport, expressed in ton kilometers, by June 2003, 
and further decrease of about 8.9% in passenger transport, measured in 
passenger kilometers. Forecasted values for June 2003 are given with respect to 
last year’s average. 
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Foreign Trade 
 
The set of variables by which we modeled foreign trade developments over the 
forecast period, is composed of time series: commodity exports and imports, real 
exchange rate1, industrial production and industrial work productivity2. In 
                                                 
1 The real exchange rate was defined as a ratio of the nominal exchange rate to the inflation growth rate in 
Serbia. 
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modeling the selected set of variables, we confirmed low exogenousness of the 
real exchange rate in relation to the parameters of the assessed relationship to 
which export and import trends adjust in the long run. The long-run relationship is 
formed by imports, exports and the real exchange rate. In the assessed structural 
error correction models, by which we modeled variables of commodity exports 
and commodity imports, we confirmed previously obtained result, which show 
that the level of the real exchange rate does not explain export trends in the 
period under consideration. The dynamics of exports are significantly determined 
by industrial production trends and industrial work productivity, while the 
dynamics of imports are significantly determined by the level of industrial 
production from the previous period and the real exchange rate. The assessed 
models of commodity exports indicate a very high degree of correspondence with 
original values over the period under observation. 
 
 
 
 
In the first months of 2003, the dynamics of exports were expected to slow down 
and decrease. However, forecasted values of export trends show that the 
cumulative value of commodity exports in the first six months of this year will be 
up by about 14.8%, year-to-year. In the forthcoming months, due to trends in the 
time series of imports, it is realistic to expect a deceleration and a fall in its 
dynamics, compared with the end of 2002. The value of imports forecasted in the 
next six months compared with the real values realized in the same period last 
year indicate some 7.8% export growth. According to the forecasted dynamics of 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 The variable industrial wok productivity is obtained as a ratio of the industrial production index to the 
number of employees in industry. 
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commodity exports and imports, the trade deficit is likely to increase by about 
3.5% in the next six months. 
 
 
In the interpretation of obtained results, we must draw attention to two facts. The 
data on commodity exports and imports for 2002 on which assessment is based, 
are only preliminary data. According to the data from July 2002, commodity 
imports increased considerably, resulting in a significantly larger foreign trade 
deficit at the year-end. 
 
Exchange Rate, Money Supply and Interest Rates on Short-Term Securities  
 
Forecasted values of the real exchange rate are obtained by modeling prices, the 
real money supply3 and the real exchange rate. We assessed a long-term 
adjustment between the three observed variables. The estimated long-run 
relationship from the previous period to a great extent explains the trends of the 
real exchange rate in the period under consideration. 
The relation of the forecasted value of the real exchange rate for June 2003 and 
its actual value in December 2002 indicates the that real exchange rate is likely 
to appreciate by as little as 1.9%, which practically means that the real value of 
the domestic currency will be maintained. 
In modeling the real money supply we started from a subset composed of three 
variables – real money supply, real exchange rate and the interest rate on short-
term securities. In the analyzed set of variables, the real exchange rate is 
identified as a weakly exogenous variable, relative to the assessed parameters of 
the long-run relationship. The dynamics of real money supply are conditioned by 
                                                 
3 Real money supply is deflationed by the inflation growth rate in Serbia 
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trends in the real exchange rate. Interest rates on short-term securities become a 
significant explanatory factor in the trends of real money supply as of the second 
half of 2002. The dynamics of interest rates are determined by real money supply 
and the real exchange rate.  
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The real money supply had a pronounced dynamics of growth in the course of 
2002. It is expected to grow further in the following period. Forecast for the first 
six months show that the real money supply is likely to increase by about 12.4% 
in June 2003, compared with December 2002. 
In several upcoming months, a slower drop in trends of interest rates on short-
term securities may be expected. According to the results of the assessed 
equation which was used in modeling short-term securities interest rates, the 
forecasted value of interest rates in June 2003 is lower by about 9.3%, compared 
to the real value for December last year. 
 
Public Finance 
 
Total public revenues registered significant growth in the last two years. In the 
first six months of 2003 we expect a further upward trend. Projected nominal 
growth in the following six months relative to the 2002 average is 30.7%. 
The forecasted values of public revenues were obtained by modeling prices, real 
wages and total public revenues. The assessed values of parameters point to a 
very high degree of adjustment of public revenues to a long-run relationship with 
prices and real wages from the previous period. The trends in real wages have a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the amount of total public revenues. 
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Serbia and Montenegro: Basic Economic  Indicators
θ 2002 XII 2002 XII 2002
θ 2001 XI 2002 XII 2001
GDP growth rate* 4.0% … … …
Industrial production 1.7% … -4.1% -0.5%
     Montenegro 0.6% … 3.3% 1.6%
     Serbia 1.7% … -4.5% -0.7%
          Central Serbia 1.6% … 2.0% -2.8%
          Vojvodina 2.1% … -15.2% 3.8%
Average nominal net wage  - Serbia, YuD 51.8% 11,555 12.3% 36.7%
Nominal gross wage  - Serbia, YuD1 … 16,643 12.5% 37.1%
Real growth in average net wage- Serbia, %2 30.2% … 12.3% 22.2%
Ratio consumer basket - average net wage -32.3% 1.0 -15.9% -28.1%
Unemployment rate - Serbia, registered3 8.1% 30.7% 0.3% 13.0%
Current account, USD million … … …
Trade balance, USD million -37.9% -415 -38.8% -94.0%
Export, USD million 19.5% 210 0.6% 18.2%
     Montenegro 9.1% 24 187.6% 262.3%
     Serbia 20.6% 186 -7.2% 9.1%
Import, USD million 30.6% 625 10.2% 59.6%
     Montenegro 28.7% 70 73.5% 105.6%
     Serbia 31.8% 553 5.1% 55.8%
Money supply (M1), in YuD million (end of period) 110.8% 115.7 -0.4% 80.8%
     Cash 122.6% 43.67 17.2% 71.6%
     Deposit 104.6% 72.03 -8.7% 86.9%
Real money supply, EUR million 107.5% 1,880.70 -0.3% 75.5%
NBY hard curr.reserves, USD mil (end of period) 95.0% 2280 9.7% 95.0%
Discount rate- monthly level -77.04% 0.77% 2.67% -40.8%
Market interest rate - monthly level -48.48% 1.50% -2.6% -38.0%
Retail prices - Serbia 19.5% … 0.8% 14.8%
Consumer prices- Serbia 16.6% … 0.0% 11.8%
Producer prices - Serbia 8.8% … 0.1% 6.1%
Medium exchange rate (YuD/EUR) - average 2.1% 61.45 0.4% 2.6%
*Preliminary figures
1By the gross wage methodology applied as of June 1, 2001.
2Deflator is consumer price index.
3  these figures include the employed in socially-owned sector, private sector and SMEs
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